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CRIMINAL LAW
TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TRIAL:
AMENDING FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 106 AND 803 TO COMPLETE
THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS
LOUISA M. A. HEINY & EMILY NUVAN*
The common law Rule of Completeness was designed to prevent parties
from introducing incomplete—and thereby misleading—statements at trial.
It ensured fundamental fairness by ensuring that a fact finder heard an entire
statement or series of statements if the whole would “complete” the partial
evidence presented. It served this important role in Anglo-American
jurisprudence for centuries before the drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence
106 attempted to capture its essence in 1975.
Unfortunately, what was once a simple and principled rule has been
muddled by Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (FRE 106). The common law rule
language was lost when FRE 106 was drafted, and there is no agreement as
to what portion of the common law survived and what was left behind.
Particularly problematic are the issues of whether FRE 106 applies to oral
as well as written statements, and whether FRE 106 allows a court to admit
otherwise inadmissible evidence. The federal and state courts are split on
these issues, and the United States Supreme Court has failed to provide
guidance. Academics and commentators in the past have suggested these
issues should be solved by amending FRE 106. However, these suggested
amendments have generally been limited to FRE 106 itself, and each has
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tucked the equivalent of a new hearsay exception into an amended 106—a
departure from the otherwise well-ordered Federal Rules of Evidence.
This Article critically examines current Rule of Completeness
jurisprudence. It compares and contrasts the common law with FRE 106, and
then dives deeply into state and federal courts disparate interpretations of
FRE 106. Finally, it recommends that the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee resolve doctrinal conflicts inherent in Rule 106 and
draft two new Rules of Evidence. First, it recommends an expanded and
clarified Federal Rule of Evidence 106 that applies to both written and oral
statements. Second, it recommends a new addition to FRE 803 that would
create a hearsay exception for statements otherwise qualified for admission
under FRE 106 but currently barred under the Rule Against Hearsay.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he greatest possibilities of error lie in trusting to a fragment of an
utterance without knowing what the remainder was.”1
—John Henry Wigmore,
Wigmore on Evidence
A man has been murdered. Police arrive at the scene to find a suspect
holding a gun. The suspect tells the police, “I did it, but it was in selfdefense.”
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution will likely call the police officer
who heard the qualified confession to the stand and ask the officer to repeat
the defendant’s confession. Although hearsay as an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement, the
confession is admissible when offered by the prosecution against the
defendant as a Statement of an Opposing Party under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2).2 Aided by meticulous witness coaching and careful
questioning, the prosecution may ask about, and the police officer may testify
to, the entire statement or only the phrase, “I did it.” By omitting the second

1
7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2094, at 601 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., 1978).
2
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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clause, “but it was in self-defense,” the prosecutor has undoubtedly left the
jury with a misleading—and incomplete view of the facts.3
The defendant, of course, wishes the jury to hear the entire statement as
the second phrase, “but it was self-defense,” substantially changes both the
legal and factual meaning of the first portion of the statement. On crossexamination, the defendant may wish to ask the officer, “after I said, ‘I did
it,’ didn’t I also tell you that I did it in self-defense?” However, any answer
is barred by the Rule Against Hearsay.4 The defendant is asking the officer
to recount a statement made out of court and wishes to offer it for the truth
of the matter asserted in the statement: that he actually acted in self-defense.5
Although an exception to the Rule Against Hearsay applies when a
defendant’s statement is offered by the prosecution, that exception does not
apply when the defendant offers his own hearsay statement.6 Further, no
other exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay generally apply to this
situation.7 To ensure the jury hears the statement in its entirety, the
defendant’s only choice is to take the stand and tell the story from his
perspective. However, this option is in direct conflict with his Fifth
Amendment right to decline to testify, and many criminal defendants find
that taking the stand does more harm than good.8
Common law courts used the Rule of Completeness (the “Rule”) to
correct or prevent damage from incomplete statements.9 Under the common

3

For a detailed, real-world example of how this type of manipulation occurs, see the case
study discussed infra Part III.
4
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) and FED. R. EVID. 802.
5
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
6
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (applying an exclusion to the Rule Against Hearsay to
statements of a party offered by an opposing party).
7
Not only would the statement be inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), but it would also
not be admissible under any exception delineated in Rule 803. Although a non-testifying
defendant is “unavailable” for purposes of the hearsay exceptions found in Rule 804, the
defendant wishes to admit self-exculpatory statements rather than self-inculpatory statements.
Thus, these statements are inadmissible as Statements Against Interest under Rule
804(b)(3)(A).
8
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .
. . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9
See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 371 F.2d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1135 (C.C.D. Ill. 1851) (No. 15,702); White v. United States, 216
F.2d 1, 7 (5th Cir. 1954); Grobelny v. W.T. Cowan, Inc., 151 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826, 828–29 (2d Cir. 1941); Affronti v. United States,
145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); Short v. United States, 271 F.2d 73, 78 (9th Cir. 1959); Haddigan
v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1970); Crawford v. United States, 198 F.2d 976, 978
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
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law Rule, “[i]n evidencing the tenor of an utterance material or relevant,
made in words, whether written or oral, in original or in copy, the whole of
the utterance on a single topic or transaction must be taken together.”10
Common law courts intended for the Rule to apply to all statements,
including those made orally,11 and to admit evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible for the purpose of correcting the manipulative use of incomplete
statements at trial.12 As a result, the Rule acted as a counterbalance to a tactic
that trial lawyers have employed for centuries: “carefully trimming a
quotation [so] they could tell the truth but use it like a lie.”13
States adopted this broad common law principle into their own rules of
evidence early in the nation’s history. Subsequently, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence codified the Rule into Federal Rule of Evidence
106 (FRE 106).14 Under FRE 106, “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction,
at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—
that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”15 This codification
was modeled on the Rule of Completeness and attempted to capture both its
idea and function.
Yet, while the common law Rule of Completeness and FRE 106 are
similar, they vary in three significant ways. First, FRE 106 omits any
reference to oral statements, making it unclear whether it applies only to
written and recorded statements or applies to oral statements as well. Second,
FRE 106 adds a timing component that was not present in the common law
rule, allowing the opposing party to stop the proceedings and demand the
immediate introduction of the remainder of the statement. Finally, FRE 106
fails to address whether a statement must be independently admissible before
a party may invoke FRE 106.
Because FRE 106 fails to address the admissibility of oral statements or
otherwise inadmissible hearsay, a significant split has developed among both

10
21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID.
§ 5072 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2021) (quoting WIGMORE, CODE OF
EVIDENCE 371 (3d ed. 1942)).
11
See id.
12
See id. § 5072.1.
13
Id.
14
See id. § 5001; see also Harold F. Baker, Completing the Rule of Completeness:
Amending Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 281, 286 (2018)
(“Put simply, Rule 106 evolved from the common law, was adopted as a state rule, and was
finally codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
15
FED. R. EVID. 106.
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state and federal courts.16 Some jurisdictions interpret FRE 106 narrowly.
These jurisdictions refuse to apply FRE 106 to oral statements. Further, they
only apply FRE 106 to written and recorded statements that are
independently admissible.17 If the missing portion of the statement is
inadmissible hearsay when offered by the party invoking FRE 106, it remains
inadmissible.18 Other jurisdictions treat FRE 106 as an expansive expression
of the common law rule. These courts apply FRE 106 to both oral and written
statements. They also treat FRE 106 as a rule of admissibility.19 In the midst
of this chaos, the United States Supreme Court has largely remained on the
sidelines.
This Article provides a broad yet deep overview of both the common
law Rule of Completeness and FRE 106 history and jurisprudence. Part I
reviews the history of the common law Rule of Completeness and compares
it to its current embodiment in FRE 106. Part II addresses the current split
among circuit and state courts and explains the reasons for the divergent
approaches.20 Part II particularly explores how courts deal with two separate
issues: (1) whether FRE 106 applies to oral statements; and (2) whether FRE
106 allows the admission of inadmissible evidence. Part III provides a recent
case study from Utah, highlighting the problems courts encounter when faced
with the unresolved issues in Rule of Completeness jurisprudence. Part IV
proposes amendments to FRE 106 that reflect the common law Rule’s
original purpose, while simultaneously ensuring that a broader interpretation
will not allow parties to circumvent other important exclusionary rules of
evidence. In addition, Part IV proposes adding another exception to the Rule
Against Hearsay that would admit “completed” statements for the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.21 Finally, the Conclusion engages in a
discussion of how changes to FRE 106 and FRE 803 will ensure greater
fairness and justice in the courtroom. Amending FRE 106 and FRE 803 at
16

See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.A.
18
See infra Section II.A.3.
19
See infra Section II.B.
20
Previous literature in this area has focused exclusively on FRE 106 jurisprudence at the
federal level but has failed to appreciate or address the current split among the states. See
Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of
Completeness: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 106, 105 MINN. L. REV. 901,
917 (2020). This article addresses both the federal and state-level splits, illustrating the multilayered confusion and conflict that attend the divergent approaches.
21
Unlike previous literature in this area, which confined its recommendations to amending
only FRE 106, this Article proposes the novel approach of adding a new hearsay exception to
admit “completed” statements. See, e.g., Capra & Richter, supra note 20.
17
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the same time will help ensure an updated and fair Rule of Completeness that
remains true to both the historical roots of the Rule of Completeness and the
current structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW RULE OF COMPLETENESS AND ITS
EVOLUTION INTO FRE 106
A. THE COMMON LAW RULE OF COMPLETENESS

Common law courts “clearly conceded and consciously applied” the
Rule of Completeness as early as the 1600s.22 The Rule was meant to prevent
parties from introducing incomplete, and therefore misleading, statements.23
The principle behind the Rule was simple. According to Wigmore,
statements, whether written or oral, are attempts to express ideas.24 To break
these ideas into pieces and view each part in isolation “would be to obtain a
false notion of the thought.”25 Because “the presence or absence or change of
a single word may substantially alter the true meaning of even the shortest
sentence,”26 “the whole of a verbal utterance must be taken together”27 in
order to prevent injustice and misinterpretation.28
The common law Rule included three main features. First, the doctrine’s
principal function allowed otherwise inadmissible evidence to be used at trial
for the purpose of completeness.29 This is known as the Rule’s “trumping
function.”30 Thus, when a party offered incomplete and misleading evidence,
an opponent had the right to admit the remainder of the statement despite
other applicable exclusionary rules.31
Second, the Rule applied to “every kind of utterance without
distinction.”32 Specifically, it applied to written and recorded statements, as

22

WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2094, at 604 (“[The law] does no more than recognize the
dictates of good sense and common experience . . . the recognition of the principle, and the
reason for it are unquestionable.”).
23
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
24
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2094, at 595.
25
Id.
26
Id. § 2094, at 597.
27
Id. § 2094 ,at 604 (emphasis omitted).
28
Id. § 2094, at 595 (“One part cannot be separated and taken by itself without doing
injustice, by producting [sic] misrepresentation.”).
29
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1 (footnote omitted).
30
Id.
31
See id. § 5072.
32
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2113, at 654.
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well as acts, declarations, and conversations.33 The Rule’s broad scope
reflected a recognition that “[a] misleading oral statement is no less unfair
than a written one.”34
Finally, most common law courts applying the Rule did not permit or
require acceleration.35 As a result, when one party offered incomplete and
misleading evidence at trial, the adverse party was required to wait until
cross-examination or the party’s own case-in-chief before admitting the
remainder of the statement.
While the common law Rule ensured a degree of fairness at trial by
disallowing the use of truncated, misleading statements by either party, it also
posed a risk of abuse. Parties were consistently concerned that opponents
would use the Rule to circumvent major exclusionary rules and admit copious
amounts of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence in the name of
completeness.36 As a result, the Rule was subject to important qualifications
and exceptions designed to guard against potential abuses.37
First, under the common law, “[n]o utterance irrelevant to the issue is
receivable.”38 This rather obvious limitation ensured that parties used the
Rule to clarify meaning and correct distortions, not admit irrelevant
evidence—even when that evidence was a part of the same oral statement or
writing.39
Second, “[n]o more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the
same subject, and is explanatory of the first part, is receivable.”40 As
33

See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10.
United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 674 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum
opinion).
35
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
36
See WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2113, at 656.
37
See id. § 2094, at 604.
38
Id. § 2113, at 656 (emphasis omitted).
39
See e.g., People v. Kent, 287 P.2d 402, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (“The rule that where
part of a conversation has been shown in testimony the remainder of that conversation may be
brought out by the opposing party, is necessarily subject to the qualification that the court may
exclude those portions of the conversation not relevant to the items thereof which have been
introduced.”); Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 340 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
(“The rule authorizing the admission of the whole of a conversation where part of it has been
introduced contemplates that the balance of the conversation will be relevant to and
explanatory of the portion already introduced.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (2018) (California
has used a codified version of the common law Rule of Completeness since 1872, and the
committee notes to the current version of the Rule clarify that it “only makes admissible such
parts of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing as are relevant to the part thereof
previously given in evidence.”).
40
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2113, at 656 (emphasis omitted).
34
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Wigmore explained, “[t]he whole that is to be considered is obviously not
the whole of a phrase or a paragraph,” but “the whole of the thought.”41
Judges had significant flexibility and discretion42 to determine what material
made up “the whole of the thought,” particularly when the statement was part
of a long or complex conversation.43
Finally, “[t]he remainder thus received” was permitted only to “aid[] in
the construction of the utterance as a whole[;] it was not in itself testimony.” 44
This principle directly addressed the fear that a party would use the Rule to
furtively circumvent other exclusionary rules, particularly those against
hearsay. This was especially a concern in criminal trials, where a defendant
might use the Rule of Completeness to admit his own self-serving hearsay
statements and, thus, avoid taking the stand on his own behalf.45
According to Wigmore, admitting the remainder of the statement for
context but not for substance helped stem these abuses:
The remainder of the utterance, regarded as an assertion of the facts contained in it, is
merely a hearsay statement, and as such has no standing. It is considered by the tribunal
merely in order to piece out and interpret the first fragment and ascertain whether as a
whole the sense of the first becomes modified.46

For example,47 under the common law Rule, when the prosecution
offered the defendant’s statement, “I did it,” but failed to offer the concurrent
statement, “but it was self-defense,” the jury was led to believe the defendant
is a confessed murderer. However, if the defendant was allowed to add the
rest of the phrase, “but it was in self-defense,” the effect was to eliminate the
distortion created by the first fragment and provide a complete understanding
of the entire phrase. In this situation, the whole expression showed a
confession was made, but it was coupled with an explanation for the event.
However, even if the reference to self-defense was material to the case, the
completion evidence could not be used to prove any fact of consequence. It
could only be used to give meaning to the shortened statement. Once the

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. § 2094, at 604.
See id. § 2113, at 659 & n.6.
Id. § 2094, at 604.
Id. § 2113, at 656 (emphasis omitted).
See Baker, supra note 14, at 297–98.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2113, at 659.
See hypothetical discussed supra Introduction.
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misleading impression was removed, the completing evidence had no further
legal effect.48
These three corollaries—requiring relevance, limiting the remainder to
finishing the thought, and barring the remainder’s use as substance—function
as limits on the broad sweep of the common law Rule of Completeness while
still preserving its purpose: protecting parties from carefully trimmed
statements that may unfairly mislead the jury and distort the truth.
Common law doctrine, including the Rule of Completeness, was first
codified in its entirety by the influential Field Code in 1850.49 That Code,
which was the first unified and codified rules of civil procedure, stated:
Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one
party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a
letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation,
or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.50

This version of the Rule of Completeness served as a model for the
Advisory Committee when it drafted FRE 106.51
B. AN EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 106

The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, codified the Rule of
Completeness.52 In its current state, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides

48
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2113, at 660. When evidence is admissible for one purpose
but not another, or against one party but not another, the court must, on timely request by a
party, issue appropriate jury instructions. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
49
The Field Code, named for its most enthusiastic drafter, David Dudley Field, was a code
of civil procedure that “systematized New York’s procedural law and combined the previously
separate systems of common law and equity.” Kellen Funk, Equity without Chancery: The
Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846–76, 36 J.
LEGAL HIST. 152, 152 (2015). Following New York’s lead, thirty other American states and
territories enacted their own versions of the code. Id. at 152–53.
50
See COMMISS’RS ON PRAC. AND PLEADING, CODE CIVIL PROC. OF THE STATE OF N.Y.
§ 1687, at 704–05 (1850). Several states, beginning with California in 1872, adopted this Field
Code provision of the Rule of Completeness into their own evidence codes and continue to
use it today. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5071 & n.70; see also CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 356 (2018). Besides California, the other states where the Field Code is still in effect are
Oregon, Nebraska, Iowa, and Texas. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.2 n.9.
51
See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (listing California
Evidence Code § 356 as a reference).
52
Rule 106 was proposed in 1972 and adopted under the Act to Establish Rules of
Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (In its
original form, Rule 106 stated: “When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other
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that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an
adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—
or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be
considered at the same time.”53 The Advisory Committee considered two key
principles in its drafting: (1) “the misleading impression created by taking
matters out of context”54; and (2) “the inadequacy of repair work when
delayed to a point later in the trial.”55 Since its adoption, the Advisory
Committee has only amended FRE 106 twice—in 1987 and 2011—but
neither of these changes substantively affected the rule.56
There are five notable differences between FRE 106 and its common
law predecessor. First, FRE 106 contains an “acceleration clause,” not
present in the common law Rule, that allows an opponent to require the
immediate introduction of completion evidence when the proponent has
offered a truncated version of a statement.57 The rationale behind FRE 106’s
acceleration function has roots in the common law Rule of Completeness,
which was concerned with abuses of the adversary system.58 Both versions
guard against the damage caused to a party when a misleading half-truth is
pulled from its context.59
However, FRE 106 goes further than the common law and recognizes
that, in some cases, a false first impression cannot be adequately remedied
by a “later, separate reading of the omitted parts.”60 Distorted impressions,

part or any other writing or recorded statement with ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.”).
53
FED. R. EVID. 106.
54
FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules.
55
Id.
56
FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendments (“The amendments
are technical. No substantive change is intended.”); FED. R. EVID. 106 committee notes to 2011
amendment (The language of the rule was amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence
Rules to make them more understandable and consistent throughout. The changes were purely
stylistic).
57
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
58
Although the common law Rule of Completeness did not itself contain a timing or
acceleration component, the Advisory Committee included an acceleration clause in FRE 106
to combat what it determined to be an abuse of the adversary system—that is, requiring a party
to wait to admit completion evidence limited the party’s ability to cure the damage done by
the introduction of the incomplete statement. The Advisory Committee added the clause in
recognition of the common law rule’s concern for such abuses. See id.
59
See 1 GEORGE E. DIX, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DAVID H. KAYE, ROBERT P.
MOSTELLER, E.F. ROBERTS & ELEANOR SWIFT, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 56, at 392
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013).
60
Id.
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once perceived, “can sometimes linger and work [their] influence at the
subconscious level.”61 A delayed review was, in the Advisory Committee’s
view, a defect in the common law rule.62 FRE 106 gives the opponent not
only the right to complete the truncated statement, but also grants the “further
right to demand that the proponent expand the scope of his questioning” at
the moment the misleading evidence is introduced.63
Second, FRE 106 only applies to incomplete writings and recorded
statements, not to oral statements.64 The Advisory Committee purposefully
limited the common law rule but provided little detail on its reason for the
change, stating only that, “[f]or practical reasons, the rule . . . does not apply
to conversations.”65
Some courts and legal academics theorized that the Advisory
Committee sought to limit the problems caused by extensive oral statements
with no clearly delineated beginning or end.66 As Wigmore noted, “oral
utterances are not marked off as distinct wholes in the way that written
utterances are. It is simple enough to see that one letter or one deed ends at
the signatures . . . [b]ut oral utterances can usually not be given any such
separate unity of character . . . .”67 Moreover, oral statements are often heard
by multiple witnesses, each of whom may only hear or remember one piece
of the whole and discard the rest.68 The Advisory Committee also may have
worried that sorting through these complications under the time pressure
exerted by the acceleration clause would disrupt the proponent’s case.69

61

Id. See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1 for further examples of the
danger of delay when misleading half-statements have been introduced by a proponent:
The opponent may suffer prejudice from the delay because the jury’s evolving view
of the case may have already been tainted by the time they hear the completing
material. The jury may, of course, find it difficult to erase from its collective mind
the misleading impression conveyed by the truncated version. But an equally grave
risk of delayed completeness is that the jurors may recognize that the corrected
version of the evidence may require them to go back and undo all the thinking they
have done using the truncated version and evade that onerous task by giving the
completing evidence less than the weight it deserves.
62

See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 59, § 56, at 393.
64
See FED. R. EVID. 106. The text of FRE 106 omits all mention of oral statements,
explicitly including only written and recorded statements. See id.
65
FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules.
66
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
67
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2099, at 619.
68
Id.
69
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
63
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Third, the newly enacted FRE 106 only allows a party to introduce
completeness evidence when that evidence ought “in fairness . . . to be
considered at the same time.”70 In contrast, the common law Rule allowed
the introduction of completeness evidence “necessary to make [the
incomplete evidence] understood,”71 a rigid rule that deprived trial judges of
discretion.72 For example, if a party introduced one of a series of letters, the
opposing party could automatically introduce the entire series on the same
topic.73 The change in language provided trial judges with flexibility that
they, up to that point, had not enjoyed. The Advisory Committee intended to
give judges more latitude than the common law allowed and used the fairness
standard to achieve that goal.74 As such, no completeness evidence is now
automatically admissible under FRE 106.75 However, the change in phrasing
also injected a “morally tinged and discretionary standard” into FRE 106
analysis, giving trial court judges significant leeway to determine what is
required by “fairness.”76 Because “fairness” is an amorphous and highly
individual standard, completion evidence may be admitted “in fairness” by
one judge but excluded by another judge in a virtually identical trial.
Fourth, FRE 106 is not an exclusionary rule.77 It does not give a party
the power to prevent an opponent “from introducing an incomplete
statement; it only gives him the power to require that the statement be
completed or to complete it himself.”78 Courts may not exclude information
that may be material to a case, but instead must provide a remedy when that
evidence is manipulated to create a misleading impression.79
Finally, unlike the common law Rule, FRE 106 is silent on the issue of
admissibility. The drafters did not address whether FRE 106 allows
completion evidence only if it would otherwise be independently
admissible;80 or if, conversely, it functions as a rule of admissibility, allowing

70

See FED. R. EVID. 106.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (2018); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
72
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5077.
73
See id. This is but one example of many automatic admissibility rules under the
common law Rule of Completeness.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
Id. § 5072.1.
77
Id. § 5078.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See id. § 5072.1.
71
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completion evidence that would ordinarily be barred by another rule. This
silence created splits on the issue at both a state and federal court level.81
C. HAS FRE 106 REPEALED AND REPLACED THE COMMON LAW
RULE OF COMPLETENESS?

Although the Advisory Committee notes say nothing about
admissibility, many courts refuse to admit evidence under the common law
Rule of Completeness when that evidence is prohibited by other exclusionary
rules.82 These courts, along with many state drafters and evidence scholars,
believe that the only intended function of FRE 106 was “altering the order of
proof to accelerate completeness.”83 As such, they believe the drafters of
FRE 106 “must have abandoned the principle function of the common law
completeness doctrine—allowing inadmissible evidence to be used for
completion.”84 However, other state drafters and courts believe this reading
of the FRE 106 makes it “largely ineffectual in exactly those kinds of
egregious abuse that spawned the common law completeness doctrine.”85 As
a result, these courts continue to follow the spirit of the common law Rule by
using FRE 106 as a rule of admissibility.
These dueling interpretations of FRE 106 lead to further, ongoing
questions: (1) is FRE 106 solely a rule that controls the timing of
completeness evidence; and (2) if FRE 106 dropped the principle “trumping
function” of the common law Rule of Completeness, did it also repeal the
common law doctrine altogether, thus banning the introduction of otherwise
admissible evidence previously allowed under the common law rule?86 Many
lower courts, state drafters, and evidence writers reached divergent positions
regarding these questions.87
Despite the conflicting positions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court
has only briefly waded into the disagreement surrounding the application of
FRE 106. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey represents the one and only time
the Court discussed FRE 106 and its relationship with its common law
predecessor.88 Although the Court confirmed that FRE 106 “partially
81

See discussion infra Part II.
See infra Section II.B.: Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts that Hold FRE 106 is
About Timing and Nothing Else.
83
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
Id. § 5072.1 & nn.68–73.
88
488 U.S. 153 (1988).
82
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codified” the common law Rule,89 the resolution of the case did little to
address the controversy and left many questions regarding FRE 106
unanswered.
D. THE SUPREME COURT INDICATES IN DICTA THAT FRE 106
“PARTIALLY” CODIFIED THE COMMON LAW RULE OF
COMPLETENESS

The United States Supreme Court has had little to say about the meaning
of FRE 106.90 It addressed FRE 106 once, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey.91 On that occasion the Court indicated in dicta that FRE 106
“partially codified” the common law Rule of Completeness but gave no
further clarification or guidance.92
In Beech Aircraft, a Navy training aircraft crashed, claiming the lives of
a Navy flight instructor and her student pilot.93 Following the crash, the two
pilots’ surviving spouses sued the plane’s manufacturer claiming a defect in
the aircraft’s fuel control system caused the crash.94 The manufacturer denied
responsibility and instead claimed the reason for the crash was pilot error.95
In the weeks following the accident, the Navy produced a JAG
investigative report. The deceased flight instructor’s spouse, also a Navy
flight instructor, took issue with the report96 and wrote a letter to the
investigator outlining his own theory of the accident.97 In that letter he both

89

Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 934 (1997). In its brief petitioning for writ of certiorari, Wilkerson’s counsel argued
the trial court’s exclusion of exculpatory evidence violated Wilkerson’s rights under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Wilkerson argued he should have been allowed to
elicit testimony from a witness under FRE 106. Even if the court deemed the evidence to be
an oral statement, it should have been admitted under “the combined operation” of FRE 611(a)
and FRE 106. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10–11, Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692 (No. 97493). See also United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
1275 (2021); United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1054
(2014); United States v. Kopp, 562 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1008
(2009).
91
488 U.S. 153 (1988).
92
Id. at 172.
93
Id. at 156.
94
Id. at 156–57.
95
Id. at 157.
96
Id. at 159.
97
Id.
90
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challenged the JAG report’s conclusions and included a detailed explanation
of how mechanical failure caused the crash.98
Although the letter was hearsay, it was admissible when introduced at
trial by the manufacturer as a statement of an opposing party under FRE
801(d)(2). The manufacturer therefore called the spouse as an adverse
witness and introduced two portions of the letter. The first was a statement
that the deceased flight instructor had attempted to cancel the flight the
morning of the crash because of her student’s fatigue.99 The second was a
statement that, due to their own error, the two pilots were forced to initiate
an abrupt maneuver when another plane unexpectedly came into view.100 The
spouse, who believed that the two admitted statements were taken out of
context, attempted to correct any misrepresentation during crossexamination. The manufacturer objected. Somewhat surprisingly, the
objection was not based on FRE 106, but rather that the question improperly
asked for an opinion. The trial court sustained the objection, and the rest of
the letter was excluded.101
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, whether
the trial court “erred in refusing to permit Rainey to present a more complete
picture of what he had written . . . .”102 Despite possible preservation issues,
the Court addressed the applicability of FRE 106. The Court had “no doubt
that the jury was given a distorted and prejudicial impression” of the letter,
and had the letter been read in its entirety, the jury would have seen that its
true purpose was to propose that the accident was the result of a power
failure.103 The Court also explained,
The common-law “rule of completeness,” which underlies Federal Rule of Evidence
106, was designed to prevent exactly this type of prejudice . . . [i]n proposing FRE 106,
the Advisory Committee stressed that it ‘does not in any way circumscribe the right of
the adversary to develop the matter on cross-examination or as part of his own case.’
We take this to be a reaffirmation of the obvious: that when one party has made use of
a portion of a document, such that misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only
through presentation of another portion, the material required for completeness is ipso
facto relevant and therefore admissible under Rules 401 and 402.104

98

Id. at 170–71.
Id. at 171.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 160.
102
Id. at 170.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 171–72 (citation omitted).
99
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The Court further acknowledged that “the Federal Rules of Evidence
have partially codified the doctrine of completeness in [FRE] 106.”105 Even
though the concerns underlying the rule were clearly relevant in this case, the
Court found it “unnecessary to address” whether FRE 106 applied, instead
resolving the matter under the general rules of relevancy.106 The Court then
explained it “need go no further in exploring the scope and meaning of FRE
106.107 Thus ended the Supreme Court’s one-and-only glance into the
controversy swirling around FRE 106 and its common law predecessor.
The majority of courts concluded the Beech decision resolved the
question of whether the common law Rule survived the adoption of FRE
106,108 holding that FRE 106 is a “complement” to the common law
completeness doctrine.109 “The reason is that, as the Supreme Court itself
appears to have recognized, FRE 106 only partially codifies the common law
doctrine of completeness, and for situations beyond the reach of FRE 106,
the common law still applies.”110 For example, the Alabama Rules of
Evidence go so far as to say that FRE 106 “constitutes a specialized
application of the common law completeness doctrine.”111
Many legal scholars also take the position that the common law Rule is
alive and well.112 The writers of the Federal Practice and Procedure Treatise
on Evidence, Wright & Graham, stated, “While the decision can be read more
narrowly . . . we think the Court impliedly held that FRE 106 does not repeal
the common law completeness doctrine.”113 McCormick on Evidence further
105

Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
Id.
107
Id.
108
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1 n.77.
109
Id. § 5072.1 & n.19.
110
United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 670 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum
opinion). See also United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The
rule of completeness is a common law doctrine partially codified in Rule 106 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.”); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The
common-law doctrine of completeness has been partially codified in Rule 106 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.”); State v. Leleae, 993 P.2d 232, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (“The common
law rule of completeness . . . is now partially found in Utah Rule of Evidence 106.”).
111
Ala. R. Evid. 106 Advisory Committee’s Notes (further explaining that “[t]his rule is
not intended to affect preexisting Alabama applications of the completeness doctrine that lie
outside the confines of Rule 106,” and then listing several examples of when the common law
completeness doctrine should be applied rather than Rule 106).
112
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.1.
113
Id. See also Baker, supra note 14, at 288 (“[I]t should be noted that Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey suggests that the common-law Rule of Completeness is not dead; rather, it
remains as a counterpart to the codified rule.”).
106
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explains that when the Court indicated FRE 106 only “partially codified” the
completeness doctrine, the implication was “that the uncodified aspect of the
doctrine is still in effect in federal court.”114
McCormick’s view is especially persuasive when considering the
Advisory Committee’s Notes to FRE 106. The notes list § 56 of
McCormick’s evidence treatise, which is the location of the previous quote,
as a reference for the rule.115 Moreover, the notes describe FRE 106 as “an
expression of the rule of completeness.”116 This is not the kind of clear
language one would expect if FRE 106 were meant to displace the common
law.
Although it seems the Supreme Court indicated in Beech that the
common law Rule is still applicable when evidence falls outside the scope of
FRE 106, the Court did not follow its own suggestion. Rather than reach its
decision through a completeness analysis, it arrived at its conclusion via
relevance instead.117 The Court, therefore, gave no indication of when the
common law doctrine may be used in lieu of FRE 106 or to what extent the
common law rule still exists.118 This ambiguity has led to a wide divergence
of interpretation among federal circuits and state courts.
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF FRE 106 SPLITS THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
AND THE STATES
Not only has the United States Supreme Court failed to provide
guidance on FRE 106’s scope but the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee has also declined to consider the problem.119 As early as 1997,
the Committee recognized the split of authority among the circuits, yet
declined to address the issue.120 Since that time, the split has only grown and
encompasses more questions.121 At a meeting on October 18, 2002, the
Committee considered two issues related to FRE 106: (1) whether the scope
114

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 59, § 56, at 392–93 n.5.
FED. R. EVID. 106 Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
116
Id. (emphasis added).
117
See Baker, supra note 14, at 288 n.37.
118
Id.
119
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5071, Proposals to Amend Rule 106.
120
See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of Meeting of April 14–15, 1997, at
9–10 (discussing the split between the circuits on the issue of whether Rule 106 allows
inadmissible evidence to be used for completion purposes).
121
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5071, Proposals to Amend Rule 106
(explaining the committee was made aware that “despite the limitation in Rule 106 to written
statements, many courts had required completeness in oral statements . . . [and] some courts
had used Rule 106 as ‘a de facto hearsay exception.’” (footnotes omitted)).
115
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of FRE 106 should be extended to cover oral statements and acts; and (2)
whether the Rule should explicitly include a “trumping function,” which
would allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to be offered for the purpose
of completion.122
Following further discussion, the Committee declined to amend the
Rule on the grounds “that the costs of amending FRE 106 . . . were far
outweighed by the risks that a change in language would be misinterpreted,
and concluded that any problems under the current rule were being wellhandled by the courts.”123 The result is a jumble of conflicting interpretations
and application. The federal circuit courts remain in conflict, and the state
courts, which are not bound by the federal circuits on this issue,124 often
ignore the views of local federal courts and forge their own paths.125 There
are even examples of conflicts within individual circuits and states.126
Part III will address these conflicting opinions, beginning with an
overview of federal and state courts that admit oral statements under FRE
106 via the interplay with the trial judge’s discretionary powers under FRE
611(a). It will also examine the reasoning behind the various positions. Part
III will then look at the difficult problem of whether otherwise inadmissible

122

See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of Meeting of October 18, 2002, at

3.
123

Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of Meeting of April 25, 2003, at 9; see
also Andrea N. Kochert, Note, The Admission of Hearsay Through Rule 106: And Now You
Know the Rest of the Story, 46 IND. L. REV. 499, 509–20 (2013) for a discussion of how a
court’s interpretation of Rule 106 has a real impact on cases. Kochert takes issue with the
October 2002 memorandum prepared by the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules, in which he “noted that while the courts appeared to be in a dispute over the
existence of a trumping function, this dispute [did] not appear to make a real difference in the
cases.” Id. at 516. Kochert offers the example of United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698 (6th
Cir. 2009) to disprove this assumption. Id. at 522–23. The rule is not just an academic problem
but a practical one as well, and it needs to be addressed.
124
See infra Section II.A.2.
125
The classic example of this is California, which did not adopt a version of Rule 106
but instead retained its own version of the common law Rule of Completeness. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 356 (2018). California’s rule extends to oral conversations and allows otherwise
inadmissible evidence to be considered. Meanwhile, the 9th Circuit strictly interprets Rule 106
and does not consider oral statements or inadmissible evidence under its doctrine of
completeness. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000).
126
See, for example, a comparison of the Fourth Circuit cases United States v. Wilkerson,
84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Gravely 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir.
1988). The two cases, discussed infra Section II.B.3.a, reach completely opposite conclusions
on the applicability of otherwise inadmissible evidence used under Rule 106; see also infra
Part III for a discussion of the inconsistent application of Rule 106 by Utah courts.
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evidence should be allowed for the purpose of completion evidence and
analyze the split of authority at both the federal and state levels.
A. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO ADMITTING ORAL STATEMENTS
UNDER FRE 106 VIA RULE 611(A)

FRE 106 omits any reference to oral statements, and by its terms applies
only to writings and recorded statements.127 Noting this omission, the
Advisory Committee explained that “[f]or practical reasons, the rule is
limited . . . and does not apply to conversations.”128 Although the Committee
had legitimate practical concerns in mind,129 there are situations where the
truncated use of an oral statement puts a party at a serious disadvantage,
particularly in criminal trials.130
Many courts, recognizing this disadvantage, hold that FRE 611(a) gives
judges power to admit unrecorded statements.131 That provision states, “[t]he
court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
examining witnesses and presenting evidence . . . .”132 Like the discretion
provided by the common law rule of completeness, FRE 611(a) is designed
to “make [the presentation of evidence] effective for determining the
truth.”133 The Advisory Committee acknowledged the importance of the
judge’s role, stating that “the ultimate responsibility for the effective working
of the adversary system rests with the judge.”134 In bestowing this great
responsibility upon judges, FRE 611(a)(1) “restates in broad terms the power
and obligation of the judge as developed under common law principles.”135
Judges are therefore entrusted to use their “common sense and fairness” to
address the many questions that arise during the course of a trial, including
127

See FED. R. EVID. 106.
FED. R. EVID. 106 Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
129
See infra text accompanying notes 151–55, 286–87 for a discussion of problems
associated with admitting oral conversations.
130
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 674 (D. Md. 2017)
(memorandum opinion).
131
See, e.g., id. For a list of the circuits that have adopted this position, see list infra note
137. For a discussion of states that use FRE 611(a) to admit oral statements, see infra Section
II.A.2; see also infra app. Table 1, Table 2.
132
FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
133
FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(1). The Advisory Committee confirmed FRE 611(a)(1)’s reliance
on the common law, explaining that this part of the Rule “restates in broad terms the power
and obligation of the judge as developed under common law principles.” FED. R. EVID. 611
Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
134
FED. R. EVID. 611 Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
135
Id.
128
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whether to allow oral statements for completion purposes and for the
ascertainment of truth.136
This Section will delineate the positions federal circuit and state courts
take on the admission of oral statements under FRE 106 through FRE 611(a)
and examine the reasoning behind their positions.
1. Federal Circuit Courts that Allow Oral Statements to be Used as
Completion Evidence
Four circuits have chosen to extend FRE 106 to oral statements via FRE
611(a), though muddled jurisprudence prevents a careful count. These
include the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.137 For example, the
Seventh Circuit held that “by its terms the rule refers to written or recorded
statements. However, FRE 611(a) gives the district courts the same authority
with respect to oral statements and testimonial proof.”138 This position is also
supported by many evidence commentators, including McCormick, who
posited that “the trial judge appears to have the same power to require the
introduction of remainder of oral conversations under Federal . . . Rule of
Evidence 611(a).”139

136

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 579 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that
the “short answer to this claim is that Rule 106 does not apply to testimony about unrecorded
oral statements,” but also acknowledging that “the district court retained substantial discretion
under Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) to apply the rule of completeness to oral statements . . . .”); United
States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 727–28 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting, without disagreement, that
other circuits “have held that Rule 611(a) imposes an obligation for conversations similar to
what Rule 106 does for writings.”); United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 652 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“The ‘rule of completeness’ allows a party to correct a misleading impression created by the
introduction of part of a writing or conversation by introducing additional parts of it necessary
to put the admitted portions in proper context. This common-law principle was codified for
written statements in Federal Rule of Evidence 106, and . . . extended to oral statements
through interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a).” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010) (“While Rule
106 applies only to writings and recorded statements, we have held the rule of completeness
embodied in Rule 106 ‘is substantially applicable to oral testimony, as well by virtue of Fed.
R. Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and presentation effective
for the ascertainment of the truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696
(2d Cir. 1994)).
138
United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing several other
Seventh Circuit cases that agree with this position); see also United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d
1386, 1392 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992).
139
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 59, § 56, at 394 n.7; see also STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 106.02[3], at 672–73 (11th ed. 2015):
137
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The Second Circuit has long held that FRE 611(a) can be used to admit
oral completeness evidence.140 In a recent decision, it even went a step further
and explicitly adopted Wright & Graham’s position141 that oral statements
are admissible under the common law rule of completeness and the issue
should have been put to rest in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.142 That case, at least according to Wright &
Graham, held that the common law completeness doctrine—which is not
limited to written or recorded statements—survived the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, including FRE 106 and 611(a).143 In United States
v. Williams, the Second Circuit agreed, concluding that, although FRE 106
does not cover oral statements, “the common law rule of completeness is
substantially broader than Rule 106, covering . . . the truncated use of acts,
declarations, and conversations . . . [a]nd as the Supreme Court made clear
in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, the common law doctrine persists in the
wake of Rule 106’s adoption.”144 The Second Circuit is the only federal
circuit court to use the common law Rule to admit oral statements for
completion purposes.145
Although some federal circuits use FRE 611(a) to admit oral testimony
for completion purposes, the same principles of relevance and fairness that
constrain the use of FRE 106 apply equally to FRE 611(a). FRE 611(a), like
FRE 106, “permits introduction only of additional material that is relevant
While Rule 106 by its terms applies only to writings and recordings, the principle
of completeness embodied in the rule has been applied to testimony about oral
statements as well (such as a police officer’s selective rendition of a defendant’s oral
statement). Whether this is mandated by Rule 106 or by Rule 611 is unimportant.
The important point is that where a party introduces a portion of an oral statement,
the adversary is entitled to have omitted portions introduced at the same time,
insofar as that is necessary to correct any misimpression that the initially preferred
portion would create.
140

See Mussaleen, 35 F.3d at 696 (“While Rule 106 applies only to writings, we have
previously explained that the rule of completeness is substantially applicable to oral testimony,
as well by virtue of Fed. R. Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.” (internal quotations omitted)).
141
See United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2019).
142
488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988).
143
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5074.1.
144
Williams, 930 F.3d at 59.
145
Id. (“This Court has expressly recognized as to oral statements that Fed. R. Evid.
611(a) both ‘empowers and obligates’ district courts to require ‘a party offering testimony as
to an utterance to present fairly the “substance or effect” and context of that statement,’ just
as the common law doctrine requires.” (quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576
(2d Cir. 1987))).
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and is necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already
introduced.”146 Further, whether a court is operating under FRE 106 or
611(a), it must “remain guided by the overarching principle that it is the trial
court’s responsibility to exercise common sense and a sense of fairness to
protect the rights of the parties while remaining ever mindful of the court’s
obligation to protect the interest of society in the ascertainment of the
truth.”147
2. State Courts that Allow Oral Statements to be Used as Completion
Evidence
Because the completeness doctrine has no constitutional basis, neither
FRE 106 nor the common law Rule are binding on the states, thus
contributing to the continuing confusion surrounding the doctrine’s
application.148 Nevertheless, nearly every state has some form of the common
law Rule, with many simply incorporating the language of FRE 106 into their
own evidence codes.149 Several states, like the majority of federal circuits,
allow oral completeness evidence under the state equivalent of FRE
611(a).150
However, variation exists even among states that take this approach. For
example, the Utah Supreme Court, although theoretically willing to apply
FRE 611(a) to oral evidence, expressed concerns about the problems inherent
in oral statements.151 As the Court correctly pointed out, “oral statements are
not easy to parse.”152 It therefore declared that “treating oral statements
identically to the written and recorded statements covered by rule 106 is
inappropriate.”153 While “the introduction of statements under the doctrine of
oral completeness should be more narrowly confined than the introduction of
statements under rule 106,”154 the court concluded that trial courts retain
discretion to admit these statements. At the same time, it declared that trial

146

United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 944 (11th Cir. 1988).
Castro, 813 F.2d at 576.
148
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.2.
149
See id. § 5071, State Adoptions.
150
See, e.g., N.D. R. EVID. 106 (“Rule 106 is not a rule of admissibility, but rather one
dealing with order of proof and, as such, may be considered to be but a specific application of
the general dictates of Rule 611.”); Schreiber v. State, 973 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (state courts have “interpreted” Rule 106 to apply to unrecorded oral statements).
151
See State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Utah 2003).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
147
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courts should consider a variety of factors, including trustworthiness and
reliability, before performing a Rule 611 analysis.155
Other states also march to the beat of their own drums, applying a wide
variety of approaches to the admission of oral evidence.156 Some states rely
on the common law Rule’s precedent of admitting oral completeness
evidence.157 For example, although Mississippi’s Rule of Evidence 106 is an
exact copy of the federal version, courts within the state rely on Mississippi
common law to extend the rule of completeness to allow oral statements.158
Others use a combined approach, allowing courts to admit oral completeness
evidence under the common law and then use their version of FRE 106 to
accelerate that completeness.159 Nevada allows oral statements based on the

155

156

Id. at 1167–68. The court went on to explain its view by stating:
The Utah Rules of Evidence are not meant to “codify the law of evidence, but to
formulate guides from which the law of evidence can grow and develop. These rules
therefore supply a fresh starting place for the law of evidence and do not present an
ultimate end.” Despite its exclusion from rule 106, the rule of oral completeness
may assist courts in the growth and development of the law of evidence and has
been invoked by the courts of other states through rules similar to our rule 611,
which requires trial courts to “make the interrogation and presentation [of evidence]
effective for the ascertainment of the truth.”

For examples of the different approaches the states take in regard to oral evidence, see
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5074.1 & nn.8, 10, 19, 21–24 (stating that Nevada
allows oral statements based on the application of their state version of Rule 106; Florida and
Indiana rely on the precedent of the common law Rule of Completeness to allow oral
statements; Maryland and West Virginia use a combined approach, admitting oral evidence
under the common law Rule of Completeness and then using Rule 106 to accelerate that
completeness; and Michigan combines Rule 106 with a Rule 403 analysis to determine
whether to admit oral statements); see also infra app. Table 2.
157
See Whitfield v. State, 933 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (while
conceding that the language of Florida Evidence Code § 90.108(1) suggests the statute only
applies to writings or recorded statements, the court applied Florida precedent applying
completeness doctrine to conversations); Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009) (explaining that the court has always held that the common law doctrine of
completeness applies to oral conversations as well as writings).
158
Regarding Mississippi’s Rule of Evidence 106, the Advisory Committee’s notes state,
“This rule is a codification of the common law doctrine of completeness . . . . However, Rule
106 is somewhat narrower than Mississippi common law. The rule only applies . . . to written
or recorded statements . . . . Under Mississippi case law the rule of completeness is extended
to other writings and even to oral statements.” See MISS. R. EVID. 106 Advisory Committee
Notes.
159
Maryland and West Virginia use the combined approach. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 10, § 5074.1 & nn.21 & 23.
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application of its own version of FRE 106,160 while Michigan combines its
version of FRE 106 with an FRE 403 analysis to determine whether to admit
oral statements.161 The problem of oral evidence never arises in states that
adopted the Field Code version of the completeness doctrine162 because that
codification already “applies to oral statements and acts.”163
3. Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts that Reject the Use of Oral
Statements Under FRE 106
Some state and federal courts, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits, strictly enforce the distinction made by FRE 106 between oral
statements and their written or recorded counterparts.164 In some
circumstances, this interpretation has the unintended consequence of
encouraging police officers to take oral, rather than recorded or written,
confessions from suspects unless they are convinced that the statement will
be completely inculpatory.165 Further, it may encourage prosecutors to rely
only on oral testimony, even when written or recorded evidence is available
and admissible.
For example, in United States v. Garcia, the Fifth Circuit held that FRE
106 was not applicable to oral statements, even when an immigration officer
testified from memory about an interrogation he conducted with the
160

See Domingues v. State, 917 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1996) (explaining that Nevada
allows oral statements based on the application of their state version of Rule 106).
161
Michigan’s court rules suggest that this is the process Rule 106 analysis would take.
See 1 JAMES K. ROBINSON, RONALD S. LONGHOFER & NORMAN C. ANKERS, MICHIGAN COURT
RULES PRACTICE: EVIDENCE 88 (2d ed. 2002).
162
See supra note 50. These states include California, Oregon, Nebraska, Iowa, Montana,
and Texas. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5071, State Adoptions.
163
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5074.1.
164
See id. § 5074.1 & nn.8, 20, 25 (stating that Alabama rejects oral statements because
its version of Rule 106 does not allow them; Colorado and New Hampshire reject oral
statements because their courts have found that the common law Rule of Completeness did
not survive the passage of Rule 106; and Kentucky prohibits defendants from using the
completeness doctrine to require witnesses to include exculpatory portions of an oral
confession).
165
See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)
(“[T]he rule of completeness . . . applies only to written and recorded statements. Because the
officer’s testimony concerned an unrecorded oral confession, the rule of completeness does
not apply.”); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
defendant was not allowed to cross-examine an FBI agent about exculpatory statements the
defendant allegedly made because “[t]he rule applies only to writings or recorded statements,
not to conversations.”); State v. Thibeault, 621 A.2d 418, 422 (Me. 1993) (raising the concern
that if defendants are not allowed to complete their oral confessions, police officers would
only record those statements that were completely inculpatory).

864

HEINY & NUVAN

[Vol. 111

defendant.166 The interrogation was recorded, but the recording was never
submitted as evidence at trial.167 The court denied the defendant’s request to
introduce the recording as completion evidence because the prosecution had
not itself introduced the recorded statements. Rather, the court held that
“[FRE] 106 does not apply to a witness’s testimony at trial” nor is simply
quoting from a transcript tantamount to admittance of the evidence.168
B. THE APPLICATION OF FRE 106 TO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD BE
OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE

The question of admissibility under FRE 106 is complex and
disputed.169 Nothing in the rule’s language, nor in the Advisory Committee’s
notes “limits the material used for completeness to evidence that satisfies the
requirements of the other exclusionary rules. Unlike federal rules of evidence
that were made subject to other exclusionary doctrines, it does not contain an
‘except as otherwise provided’ clause.”170 At the same time, nothing in FRE
106’s language or notes explicitly provides for the admission of evidence that
would normally be prohibited by another exclusionary rule.171
As a result, FRE 106 can be read in two ways. Under one reading, FRE
106 simply governs the timing of presenting evidence and does not serve as
a rule that admits the otherwise inadmissible. Under the other reading,
FREFRE106 retains the “trumping function” it had under the common law,
which allows the party invoking FRE 106 to admit evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible under other exclusionary rules.172
This Section will consider how federal circuit courts and state courts
address the “trumping” issue and examine the reasoning behind these
positions.

166

530 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 351.
168
Id. at 353.
169
Unlike the question regarding Rule 106’s applicability to oral statements, Rule 611(a)
cannot be used in this situation. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5072.2 (“Rule 611
does not purport to give the trial judge any power to admit inadmissible evidence.”).
170
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1.
171
See FED. R. EVID. 106.
172
Id.
167
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1. Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts that Hold FRE 106 is
About Timing and Nothing Else
Some circuits hold that FRE 106 “does not compel admission of
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.”173 Courts that subscribe to this
version of the doctrine interpret FRE 106 as solely governing evidence that
would otherwise be admissible under the rules and “simply allowing for its
introduction at a more appropriate time.”174 These courts are primarily
concerned about parties who use FRE 106 to introduce evidence that
circumvents major exclusionary rules,175 particularly criminal defendants
who use the rule to introduce inadmissible, self-serving exculpatory
statements—without testifying themselves—under the cover of
completeness.176
This attempted circumvention often occurs in criminal cases where the
defendant’s prior out-of-court statement, usually to a government
investigator, is admissible when offered by the prosecution but inadmissible
hearsay when offered by the defendant himself. For example, and as
described in the Introduction, a defendant might make oral or recorded
statements to the police.177 Although hearsay, these statements are admissible
under FRE 801(d)(2)178 when offered by the prosecution at the defendant’s
trial.179 These “[a]dmissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the
category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the
result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule.”180 In essence, an opposing party’s statement is admitted
because “a party opponent is already present in a proceeding to explain,
justify, or even deny an alleged admission.”181 If the prosecution only admits
the inculpatory statements made by a defendant to the police, as is often the
case, the defendant has the ability to take the stand and rebut those statements
with the exculpatory statements that were also made. Because the defendant
173

U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1375–76 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Baker, supra note 14, at 297.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 298.
177
See hypothetical discussed supra Introduction.
178
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). An opposing party’s statement may be offered against the
opposing party at trial because such statements are not considered hearsay. Id.
179
See FED. R. EVID. 801 Advisory Committee’s Note (1972 Proposed Rules) (stating that
“[a] party’s own statement is the classic example of an admission.”).
180
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
181
Jared M. Kelson, Note, Government Admissions and Federal Rule of Evidence
801(D)(2), 103 VA. L. REV. 355, 360 (2017) (citing 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254, at
259–61 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013)).
174
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has the ability to counter these attacks through his own testimony at trial,
some courts see no reason for allowing inadmissible evidence to be admitted
under FRE 106.182
A few federal circuits, including the Sixth183 and Ninth184, firmly and
consistently hold that inadmissible evidence is not allowed under FRE 106.185
In one memorable case from the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Adams, the
Court acknowledged the unfairness of not allowing completion evidence
when the government significantly and inaccurately cropped the transcribed
statements of the defendants and presented them as evidence at trial.186
Although it agreed “that these examples highlight the government’s unfair
presentation of the evidence, this court’s bar against admitting hearsay under
FRE 106 leaves defendants without redress.”187 These circuits see FRE 106
as inflexible in its application, no matter how egregious the conduct of the
party admitting misleading evidence. 188
State courts are similarly divided on whether FRE 106 admits
inadmissible evidence. At least ten states bar the introduction of otherwise

182
See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 651–52 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations
omitted) (“Out-of-court statements made by a party-opponent are an exception to the general
hearsay rule. This exception reflects that ‘the adversarial process allows the party-declarant to
rebut his or her own admissions by testifying at trial. This hearsay exception does not,
however, ‘extend to a party’s attempt to introduce his or her own statements through the
testimony of other witnesses.’”).
183
See id. at 652 (“[T]he rule of completeness ‘is not designed to make something
admissible that should be excluded.’”) (quoting United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373
(6th Cir. 1982)); United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) (“We have determined previously that Rule 106 covers an order
of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that should be excluded.
Right or wrong, this court has acknowledged that . . . exculpatory hearsay may not come in
solely on the basis of completeness.”).
184
See United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)
(adopting Second Circuit rule that “Rule 106 does not compel admission of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence.”); United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n.9 (9th Cir.
2007) (“Rule 106 does not render admissible otherwise inadmissible hearsay.”); United States
v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because the officer’s testimony concerned an
unrecorded oral confession, the rule of completeness does not apply. Even if the rule of
completeness did apply, exclusion of Ortega’s exculpatory statements was proper because
these statements would still have constituted inadmissible hearsay.”).
185
The Second Circuit similarly held this position, but has in recent years repudiated this
precedent. See infra note 207.
186
See Adams, 722 F.3d at 826–27.
187
Id. at 827.
188
See infra Part III.
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inadmissible evidence for completeness.189 And the case law in two other
states, Florida and Mississippi, is unclear, leaving the question of
admissibility in doubt.190
Among the states that bar otherwise inadmissible evidence, Oregon
provides a particularly interesting example. It did not adopt a version of FRE
106 into its evidence code.191 Instead, it adopted the Field Code version,
which is a complete codification of the common law doctrine adopted in
1850.192 However, out of all the states that adopted the Field Code, only
Oregon “wrote an explicit prohibition on the use of inadmissible evidence
for completeness into its version of the Field Code.”193 Oregon’s unique
approach highlights the confusion and disarray among the states, owing to a
lack of unified guidance at the federal level.
2. Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts that Hold FRE 106 Admits
the Inadmissible
Many courts rejected the notion that only admissible evidence can be
used to provide completion evidence under FRE 106. The D.C. Circuit issued
one of the most influential opinions on the subject in United States v.
Sutton.194 There, the Court recognized the primary purpose of the rule:
[FRE] 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some
otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered
evidence should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the
specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and
the trial court.195

189
These states include Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and Tennessee. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10,
§ 5078.1. Although Maryland is included in this list, it is important to note that the Maryland
judiciary holds that only its version of Rule 106 does not allow evidence that is otherwise
inadmissible to be admitted. “However, where the evidence sought to be admitted is not
otherwise admissible, the evidence may be admitted in fairness” under the common law
doctrine of verbal completeness. See Otto v. State, 187 A.3d 47, 61 (Md. 2018); see also infra
app. Table 2.
190
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1; Schreiber v. State, 973 So. 2d 1265,
1269 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“The authorities and Florida case law are not unanimous
on this issue.”).
191
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.2 & n.8; see also supra note 50.
192
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.2 & n.8.
193
Id.
194
801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For a similar discussion about Sutton’s influential
effect on FRE 106 jurisprudence, see Capra & Richter, supra note 20, at 915–16.
195
Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368.
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Sutton considered the structure of FRE 106 and determined that it “is
concerned with more than merely the order of proof.”196 First, FRE 106 is not
embedded in FRE 611, which governs the “Mode and Order of Examining
Witnesses and Presenting Evidence.”197 Rather, it is located in Article I,
“which contains rules that generally restrict the manner of applying the
exclusionary rules.”198 Furthermore, FRE 106, unlike every other major rule
of evidence,199 does not contain a proviso referring back to, or deferring to,
other rules of evidence. Thus, it does not include the phrase “except as
otherwise provided by these rules.”200 This absence indicates “that the
draftsmen knew of the need to provide for relationships between rules and
were familiar with a technique for doing this.”201 The lack of such a proviso
suggests “that [FRE] 106 should not be so restrictively construed.”202 Thus,
when a party introduces misleading evidence, a trial court can use its
discretion to “permit such limited portions [even if they are otherwise
inadmissible] to be contemporaneously introduced as will remove the
distortion that otherwise would accompany the prosecution’s evidence.”203
This approach, the court recognized, is the most likely to comport with FRE
102, which requires that the “rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration . . . [so] the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.”204 Finally, Sutton concluded that FRE 106’s grounding in
“fairness” should also be interpreted to include “the common-law
requirements that the evidence be relevant, and be necessary to qualify or
explain the already introduced evidence allegedly taken out of context.”205

196

Id.
See FED. R. EVID. 611.
198
Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368 (citation omitted).
199
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (irrelevant evidence), 501 (privileges), 602 (lack of
personal knowledge), 613(b) (examining witness concerning prior statement), 704 (opinion
on ultimate issue), 802 (hearsay), 806 (credibility of declarant), 901(b)(10) (methods of
authentication), 1002 (original writing).
200
Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368 (footnotes omitted).
201
Id. (footnote omitted).
202
Id. (footnote omitted).
203
Id. at 1369.
204
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 102.
205
Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1369.
197
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Along with the D.C. Circuit, the First,206 Second,207 Third,208 and Tenth
Circuits209 support reading FRE 106 broadly to conform with FRE 102,210
with fairness as the lodestar. A recent Second Circuit opinion held that “when
the omitted portion of a statement [which is otherwise inadmissible] is
properly introduced to correct a misleading impression or place in context
that portion already admitted, it is for this very reason admissible for a valid,

206
See United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations
omitted) (First Circuit case law “unambiguously establishes that the rule of completeness may
be invoked to facilitate the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Other circuits
have held differently, but we adhere to our own precedent.”).
207
Early decisions of the Second Circuit rejected a broad interpretation of Rule 106 and
refused to admit completion evidence that was otherwise inadmissible. See, e.g., United States
v. Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Rule 106 does not ‘render admissible evidence
that is otherwise inadmissible.’”) (quoting United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir.
1983)). However, beginning in 2007, the Second Circuit abruptly changed its position to the
opposite viewpoint. See United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (“[E]ven though a statement may be hearsay, an omitted
portion of [the] statement must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted
portion, to place the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair
and impartial understanding of the admitted portion.”). Subsequent Second Circuit opinions
have all relied on this holding to support a broad interpretation of Rule 106. See United States
v. Kopp, 562 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 85 (2d Cir.
2012); United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 60 (2d Cir. 2019).
208
See United States v. Green, 694 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting with
approval the opinion of the D.C. Circuit that Rule 106 “permits the introduction of evidence
that is otherwise inadmissible under other Federal Rules.”), aff’d, 875 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1989).
209
The Tenth Circuit only recently adopted the position that Rule 106 allows the use of
inadmissible evidence for completeness purposes. As late as 2001 in the case of Echo
Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089–90 (10th Cir. 2001), the
court noted that it was unclear whether Rule 106 could be read to permit inadmissible hearsay
evidence and declined to resolve the issue. However, the court has since adopted a stronger
opinion in favor of a broad application of Rule 106. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596
F.3d 716, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing to United States v. Bucci and United States v. Sutton
for support of the position that “[e]ven if the fact allocution would be subject to a hearsay
objection, that does not block its use when it is needed to provide context for a statement
already admitted”); United States v. Harry, 816 F.3d 1268, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2016)
(discussing the inclusion of fairness in the text of Rule 106 and citing to United States v.
Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735, as precedent—“This fairness principle can override the rule
excluding hearsay.”).
210
See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer every
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of
evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”). For a
discussion of how the Rule of Completeness and Rule 106 interact with the interest of finding
truth, see generally Collin D. Hatcher, The Whole Truth or Anything But . . . : How Fairness,
Reliability, and the Rule of Completeness Affect the Jury’s Truth-Seeking Function, 39 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 683 (2016).
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nonhearsay purpose: to explain and ensure the fair understanding of the
evidence that has already been introduced.”211 Eight states agree,212 while two
others occasionally and inconsistently adopt this analysis.213
3. Federal Circuits with Conflicting Opinions and New Approaches
Contrary to most federal circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit has been
unable to maintain a consistent stance on the admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence for the purposes of completion. Its case law reflects
significant contradictions. Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit has advocated for
a different method of dealing with the question of inadmissible evidence
altogether.
a. The Oscillating Position of the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit is a circuit in flux. In United States v. Gravely, the
defendant introduced hearsay grand jury testimony by government witnesses
under FRE 804(b)(1)(B) after the witnesses claimed their Fifth Amendment
right not to testify at trial.214 The court held that the government was entitled
to invoke the Rule of Completeness and introduce portions of the grand jury
testimony omitted by the defendant.215 The court admitted the evidence even
though the grand jury statements were only admissible when offered against
211

United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 60 (2d Cir. 2019).
These states are Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, New Hampshire, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1. Although
Wright & Graham list Arizona and Delaware among the group of states that bar inadmissible
evidence for completeness purposes (see id.), recent case law from those states confirms the
opposite. Therefore, Arizona and Delaware are new additions to the group of states that do
admit otherwise inadmissible evidence for completion. See Thompson v. State, 205 A.3d 827,
834 (Del. 2019) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted) (“Rule 106 codifies the
common-law rule of completeness, and its purpose is to prevent misleading impressions which
often result from taking matters out of context. In certain circumstances, Rule 106 can render
otherwise inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, admissible.”); State v. Tinnell, No. 2 CACR 2018-0126, 2019 WL 2894359, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 3, 2019) (quoting State v.
Prasertphong, 114 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2005)) (“[A] hearsay statement introduced under ‘the
rule of completeness,’ pursuant to Rule 106, is ‘admissible on a nonhearsay theory,’ provided
the admitted evidence is ‘so closely connected to the part the proponent contemplates
introducing that it furnishes integral context for that part.’”); see also infra app. Table 2.
213
Florida and Mississippi courts have occasionally allowed the use of otherwise
inadmissible evidence for completion, but there are examples of the opposite position as well,
so the ultimate outcome is uncertain. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1 &
nn.80 & 81.
212

214
215

840 F.2d 1156, 1163–64 (4th Cir. 1988).

Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (creating a hearsay exception for the former
testimony of an unavailable declarant).
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the government—the party who had a prior opportunity and similar motive
to develop the former testimony as required by FRE 804(b)(1)(B)—and not
when offered by the government against the defendant.216 The omitted
portions, while perhaps not admissible standing alone, were admissible as a
remainder of a recorded statement. The court held that FRE 106 allows an
adverse party to introduce any other part of a writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously. This holding
simply speaks to the obvious notion that parties should not be able to lift
selected portions out of context.217
Following Gravely, it seemed that the Fourth Circuit adopted a broad
reading of FRE 106. However, a few years later, in United States v.
Wilkerson, the court made an about-face and abruptly held that FRE 106 does
not “render admissible the evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under
the hearsay rules.”218 To further complicate matters, in United States v.
Bollin, the court hinted that the Gravely view was not completely
abandoned.219 Instead, “[t]he fact that some of the omitted testimony
arguably was exculpatory does not, without more, make it admissible under
the rule of completeness.”220 The court suggested that if excluded testimony
is relevant and necessary to avoid misleading the jury or place the admitted
testimony in context, it may provide the “something more,” regardless of
whether the evidence is independently admissible.221
In response to this uncertainty, Paul W. Grimm, a federal district court
judge in the Fourth Circuit, issued a memorandum opinion in United States
v. Bailey which analyzed all aspects of FRE 106 jurisprudence throughout
the country and offered suggestions for how the rule should be applied in the
Fourth Circuit.222 The court explicitly noted the confusion within the circuit

216

Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1163–64.
Id. at 1163.
218
84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526
(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Rule 106 does not . . . render
admissible the evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”); United
States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (holding that not only does the Rule of Completeness not allow otherwise
inadmissible evidence, it does not “require the admission of self-serving, exculpatory
statements made by a party which are being sought for admission by that same party.”).
219
264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Chamberlain, 868 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2017).
220
Bollin, F.3d at 414.
221
Id.
222
322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 666–68 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum opinion).
217
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and stated that “until this split in authority has been resolved, a court may
allow inadmissible evidence under the completeness doctrine[.]”223
b. The Innovative Approach of the Seventh Circuit
Early on, the Seventh Circuit introduced a novel method for dealing
with Rule of Completeness questions. In United States v. LeFevour, the court
held that “[i]f otherwise inadmissible evidence is necessary to correct a
misleading impression, then either it is admissible for this limited purpose by
force of [FRE] 106, . . . or, if it is inadmissible . . . the misleading evidence
must be excluded too.”224 Thus, if the opposing party cannot complete the
misleading statement, the proposing party cannot offer the incomplete
evidence in the first place. This interpretation attempts to reach a middle
ground between the competing views adopted in the other circuits.225
LeFevour reasoned that the only legitimate purpose for admitting
otherwise inadmissible material is “pulling the sting from evidence” that an
opposing party seeks to use against the other.226 This objective is achieved
either by excluding the entire statement or admitting the truncated portion for
the sole purpose of correcting a misleading impression.227 Following this path
allows misleading evidence to be neutralized without permitting FRE 106 to
“override every privilege and other exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal
armamentarium.”228
Although several other courts, including those in the Seventh Circuit,229
have cited LeFevour as precedent for allowing the use of otherwise
inadmissible evidence under FRE 106, none have adopted the suggestion that
misleading evidence in its entirety should be excluded.230 Thus, LeFevour
remains an interesting anomaly in Rule of Completeness jurisprudence.

223

Id. at 675–76.
798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted).
225
See Michael A. Hardin, This Space Intentionally Left Blank: What to Do When Hearsay
and Rule 106 Completeness Collide, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1314–15 (2013).
226
LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981.
227
See Hardin, supra note 225, at 1315.
228
LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981.
229
See United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing LeFevour as
precedent for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence to correct misleading impressions
under Rule 106).
230
See Baker, supra note 14, at 301–02 & n.117.
224
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4. Scholarly Work Arguing that FRE 106 Admits the Inadmissible
Many evidence scholars231 also unequivocally embrace a broad
interpretation of FRE 106. For example, McCormick criticizes a literalist
reading of the rule:
It is sometimes stated that the additional material may be introduced only if it is
otherwise admissible. However, as a categorical rule, that is unsound. In particular, the
statement is sometimes inaccurate as applied to hearsay law. At least when the other
passage of the writing or statement is so closely connected to the part the proponent
contemplates introducing that it furnishes essential context for that part, the passage
becomes admissible on a nonhearsay theory. 232

Wright & Graham agree for four reasons.233 First, nothing in the facial
language of FRE 106 “limits the material used for completeness to evidence
that satisfies the requirements of the other exclusionary rules.”234 The
Advisory Committee’s Note is also silent on the issue, but it does point to
California’s codification of the common law Rule as one of the models for
FRE 106.235
Second, when the Advisory Committee first published the Preliminary
Draft of FRE 106, the Justice Department wanted to include the words
“which is otherwise admissible” to the clause describing material used for
completion purposes.236 The Advisory Committee rejected this proposal, as
did the Senate Judiciary Committee when the Justice Department appealed
to it for inclusion of the words.237

231

See, e.g., Faust F. Rossi, Evidence: 1999–2000 Survey of New York Law, 51 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 489, 498–99 (2001). In discussing the view that Rule 106 only allows admissible
evidence for completion, Rossi stated:
This approach makes little sense. If the explanation required to prevent distortion
must be admissible independent of its corrective function, then the purpose of the
rule of completeness is defeated. Either the explanatory statement is non-hearsay
because it is being offered for the limited purpose of providing context or avoiding
distortion or it should be admitted as a form of rebuttal exception to the rule against
hearsay.
See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1, nn.42, 44–49, for a list of scholarly
evidence writers who take the position that Rule 106 permits the use of inadmissible evidence
for completion purposes.
232
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 59, § 56, at 395–96.
233
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1.
234
Id.
235
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. Advisory Committee Notes (1972).
236
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1.
237
Id.
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Third, even though FRE 106 is ambiguous on the point, FRE 102’s
requirements of fairness in administration, ascertainment of truth, and justly
determined proceedings seem to require the use of inadmissible evidence for
completeness in some cases.238 As Wright & Graham stated, “[n]o one has
ever explained how these standards would be met by a construction that
would allow a party to present evidence out of context so as to mislead the
jury, then assert an exclusionary rule to keep the other side from exposing his
deception.”239
Finally, FRE 102 also encourages the “growth and development of the
law of evidence.”240 To achieve this, it is necessary to “look at the prior law
in federal courts to discover the background against which . . . [FRE] 106
was drafted.”241 This exercise leads back to the federal common law Rule of
Completeness, which allowed parties to use inadmissible evidence to
complete truncated statements.242
III. A CASE STUDY IN CONFUSION: HOW UTAH COURTS HAVE
STRUGGLED WITH RULE 106 AND THE DOCTRINE OF
COMPLETENESS
Courts across the nation are stymied by questions of whether FRE 106
applies to oral statements and makes otherwise inadmissible evidence
admissible under the purposes of completion. Utah provides an excellent case
study of courts that struggle with these issues.
In May of 2011, James Raphael Sanchez beat his girlfriend to death in
an apartment in Salt Lake County, Utah. Sanchez admitted to “punching,
slapping, kicking, stomping, grabbing” and repeatedly strangling the victim
to unconsciousness before reviving her.243 Somewhere between five and nine
hours after the assault began, Sanchez strangled her for a final time by
placing “his forearm across the front of her neck” and leaning into her.244 She
blacked out.245 After attempts to revive her failed, Sanchez lay down next to
her and fell asleep.246 When Sanchez awoke and found her dead, he called
238

Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 102.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1.
240
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 102.
241
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5078.1.
242
Id.
243
State v. Sanchez, 380 P.3d 375, 379 (Utah App. 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 422 P.3d 866 (Utah 2018).
244
Id. at 388.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 379.
239
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911, left the door open for paramedics, and went to a friend’s house.247 There
“Sanchez took off his bloody pants and socks and took a nap.”248
Sanchez admitted to the crime but argued that he was entitled to a
reduction of both the charge and possible sentence because he was under
extreme emotional distress at the time of the murder.249 The judge, consistent
with Utah’s “special mitigation” statute, instructed the jury that, were it to
find that Sanchez had been under the influence of “extreme emotional
distress” and that “a reasonable person facing the same situation would have
reacted in a similar way,”250 it should find Sanchez guilty of manslaughter
rather than murder.251
At trial, the prosecution called the investigating detective to the stand.
The detective testified on direct examination that he interviewed Sanchez
after he was arrested, and that Sanchez admitted to the assault.252 On crossexamination the defense attempted to elicit additional statements Sanchez
made during the interview in order to prove the elements of the special
mitigation statute.253 Sanchez told police that during the attack he was “under
extreme emotional distress caused by [the victim] repeatedly telling him that
she was cheating on him with his brother.”254 “To establish the requisite
extreme emotional distress, Sanchez sought to admit his statement to police
that ‘he started fighting with [Victim] because he thought she was cheating
on him with . . . his brother.’”255 “He said ‘this enraged him,’ that Victim
‘admitted it and she kept saying it,’ and “that hurt [his] feelings.”256 The
prosecution, however, objected that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay,
and the trial court agreed when Sanchez was unable to identify an exception
to the Rule Against Hearsay that would admit his statements. Although
Sanchez could have testified to this information himself, he chose not to. The
jury ultimately convicted Sanchez of first-degree murder.257
247

Id.
Id.
249
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(2)(b) (West 2019) (stating that “[s]pecial
mitigation exists when a defendant causes the death of another . . . under the influence of
extreme emotional distress that is predominantly caused by the victim’s highly provoking act
immediately preceding the defendant’s actions.”).
250
Sanchez, 380 P.3d at 387.
251
See § 76-5-205.5(5)(b)(iii).
252
Sanchez, 380 P.3d at 379.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 387.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 387–88.
257
Id. at 379. Sanchez was also convicted of obstruction of justice.
248
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Sanchez appealed his conviction, arguing that if his statements had been
admitted, they “would have supported his claim for a reduced charge based
on special mitigation for extreme emotional distress.”258 The Utah Court of
Appeals engaged in a detailed analysis of Utah’s version of FRE 106259 and
determined that Sanchez’s statement had been improperly excluded under
FRE 106’s fairness standard.260 The court was particularly worried that,
because Sanchez did not testify at trial, there was no evidence of Sanchez’s
explanation of the murder.261
The court of appeals also disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that
“the fairness analysis does not require the admission of [Sanchez’s]
statements offered to explain the reasons for his brutal assault on the victim,
because the explanation was a self-serving, after-the-fact explanation.”262
Rather, the court of appeals noted that “[t]here is no legal principle which
excludes statements or conduct of a party solely on the ground they are selfserving. If otherwise admissible, a party has as much right to his own
evidence as to the evidence of any other witness.”263 In fact, Sanchez’s
statement was necessary to “qualify, explain, or place in context the portion
of his confession introduced by the detective’s testimony.”264
The appeals court also addressed the issue of admissibility in light of
Rule 807 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (URE), also known as the residual
exception. This exception provides that “a hearsay statement is not excluded
by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered
by a hearsay exception” so long as “admitting it will best serve the purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice.”265 URE 106 can thus operate to
create a residual hearsay exception under the bounds of URE 807 because “it
is difficult to see how a statement that in fairness ought to be considered
would not serve the interests of justice.”266 In sum, the court concluded “that
258

State v. Sanchez , 422 P.3d 866, 868–69 (Utah 2018).
See Sanchez, 380 P.3d at 380–85.
260
Id. at 382.
261
Id. at 381. See also State v. Leleae, 993 P.2d 232, 243 (Utah App. 1999) (finding that
the fairness standard did not require admission of a self-serving statement but only because
the “defendant had an adequate opportunity during cross-examination to put the selected
portions of his statement in context, and other testimony supported his version of the events.”).
262
Sanchez, 380 P.3d at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
263
Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215, 216 (Utah 1983) (per curiam opinion)).
264
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
265
UTAH R. EVID. 807(a). The Advisory Committee Notes state that this rule is the federal
rule, verbatim. Meaning, this same reasoning that completeness evidence is a residual
exception to the hearsay rules could also be applied at the federal level.
266
See Sanchez, 380 P.3d at 384.
259
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[URE] 106 allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay if under
the fairness standard the evidence should be considered.”267 Although the
court concluded that the statement should have been admitted, the court
ultimately found that its exclusion was a harmless error because the facts did
not support a defense under the state’s special mitigation statute.268 There
was, the court concluded, “no reasonable probability” that, had the jury heard
that “Sanchez told police that Victim hurt his feelings and enraged him” 269
when she refused to stop saying she cheated on him with his brother, “the
jury would have found by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable
person facing the same situation would have reacted similarly.”270
Sanchez appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court heard his case.271 The
Utah Supreme Court began with a necessary threshold question: “[d]oes the
evidence to be admitted qualify as a writing or recorded statement under rule
106?”272 Somewhat surprisingly, neither party briefed this question, and the
court felt that it could not properly answer it either.273 The problem, the court
explained, was “[n]either party introduced the actual transcript of the
detective’s interview” with Sanchez into evidence at trial, which would have
undoubtedly made it a “recorded” statement subject to URE 106.274 While
the detective was on the stand, he testified extensively about his conversation
with Sanchez and used the transcript on multiple occasions to refresh his
memory under URE 612,275 but the transcript was never admitted.276 Further,
it was unclear from the record whether the prosecution or the detective ever
directly quoted from the transcript during the detective’s testimony.277 As a
267

Id. at 382.
Id. at 388.
269
Id.
270
Id. Interestingly, neither the trial court nor the court of appeals addressed the fact that
Sanchez’s statement to the police was hearsay-within-hearsay. Sanchez’s out-of-court
statement was, in fact, recounting the out-of-court statement of his girlfriend as well. As a
result, Sanchez’s statement was inadmissible hearsay unless he could identify an exception to
the Rule Against Hearsay for both his statement and his girlfriend’s statement. See UTAH R.
EVID. 805.
271
State v. Sanchez, 422 P.3d 866, 870 (Utah 2018) (“The court of appeals held that the
trial court should have admitted the evidence under rule 106, but that the error was harmless.
Mr. Sanchez appealed the harmless error determination. The state cross-appealed the rule 106
decision.” (internal citation omitted)).
272
Id. at 872.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
See UTAH R. EVID. 612(b) for the process of refreshing a witness’s memory at trial.
276
Sanchez, 422 P.3d at 872.
277
Id. at 872–73.
268
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result, the court was unable to determine how extensively the transcript had
been used.278 The court pointed out it had “previously left open the question
of whether ‘rule 106 applies to transcribed oral statements that are used
extensively at trial but are not actually introduced into
evidence’ . . . [a]nd . . . [it] certainly left open the question . . . if transcribed
oral statements are not used extensively at trial.”279
Because the extent of the transcript’s use at trial was a mystery, and the
threshold applicability of URE 106 remained in serious doubt, the court
declared that it “need not reach the issues of whether rule 106 would apply
to the prosecution’s use of the transcript or require the admission of
statements that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay.”280 The court
acknowledged the importance of URE 106’s admissibility question, but
found it unnecessary to decide the issue because any potential error in the
case was harmless.281 Thus, the Utah Supreme Court vacated the portion of
the court of appeals decision that concerned URE 106.282 And with that,
Utah’s stance on the Rule of Completeness remained an open question.
This constrained interpretation of URE 106 may have unintended
consequences. It encourages prosecutors to abuse the adversary system by
not admitting transcripts of police interviews, even when they exist, into
evidence. Law enforcement officials may take the stand, testify about all the
inculpatory statements they remember the defendant making, and remain safe
in the knowledge that the exculpatory statements are hidden away in an
unreachable transcript.283 The Utah Supreme Court in Sanchez noted that,
because the detective used the transcript to refresh his memory on the stand,
Sanchez was provided with specific options under URE 612(b) that he could
have employed including the ability “to introduce in evidence any portion [of
the writing] that relates to the witness’s testimony.284 While this may have
been true in Sanchez, this suggestion has only taught prosecutors in future

278

Id. at 872.
Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 345 P.3d 1195, 1210 (Utah 2015)).
280
Id. at 873.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
A defendant may not rely upon their own use of the transcript to trigger admissibility
under Utah Rule of Evidence 106. It only allows “an adverse party . . . [to] require the
introduction” of a writing or recorded statement when “a party introduces all or part of a
writing or recorded statement.” UTAH R. EVID. 106 (emphasis added).
284
See UTAH R. EVID. 612(a) & 612(b) (“[W]hen a witness uses a writing to refresh
memory . . . [a]n adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness about it, and to introduce in evidence any portion that
relates to the witness’s testimony.”).
279
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cases to ensure their witness’s memory need not be refreshed before taking
the stand.
Because Sanchez involved a grisly murder, an unsympathetic defendant,
and procedural complications, it was not the ideal vehicle for a full analysis
of FRE 106. However, the problems typified by this case are likely to be
replicated in later cases, not just in Utah, but nationwide. Thus, the Federal
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence is the most appropriate and
expeditious venue for a revision of FRE 106.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING FRE 106 AND ADDING A NEW
FRE 803 EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
The multiple problems in the current embodiment of FRE 106 and its
state equivalents require a multi-pronged amendment. Not only must FRE
106 be amended to clearly address oral statements, but FRE 803 should
likewise be amended to clearly create an exception to the Rule Against
Hearsay for otherwise admissible completion evidence.
In its current embodiment, FRE106 only applies to a “writing or
recorded statement.”285 This language should be changed to include oral
statements as well. The Rule should be amended as follows:
Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party
may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part – or any other writing or
recorded statement – that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

While courts are right to be wary of the problems caused by oral
evidence,286 the Advisory Committee could mitigate these issues with a
careful explanation of how the process concerning oral statements would
work.287 Because, as noted by Wigmore and discussed in Section I.A, oral
evidence may have no clearly delineated beginning or end and may involve
multiple witnesses,288 these statements will often require careful scrutiny in
light of factors such as trustworthiness and reliability. For example, recorded
confessions given to law enforcement officers, summarized confessions
transcribed in officers’ notes, or oral statements that were witnessed by
285

FED. R. EVID. 106.
See discussion, supra Section II.A.
287
The Utah Supreme Court already provided an excellent example of this process in its
opinion in State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 1167–68 (Utah 2003). See discussion of the case
supra Section II.A.2.
288
See WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2099, at 619; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, at
§ 5072.1; United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 670 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum
opinion).
286

880

HEINY & NUVAN

[Vol. 111

multiple people would all qualify as oral statements with a high indicium of
reliability. Thus, a trial court could admit the evidence for the purpose of
completion.
While the desire to avoid disputes about the content of oral statements
is a legitimate concern for trial courts, those concerns do not justify creating
a blanket prohibition against oral statements.289 Such a comprehensive ban is
unwarranted, and it invites prosecutors and investigators to avoid written or
recorded confessions, the use of transcripts or recordings at trial, or
refreshing a witnesses recollection.290 To prevent any abuse that might occur
under this expanded application, the Advisory Committee should set three
parameters, carefully circumscribing this right and ensuring proper
application of the “fairness” requirement embodied in the language of FRE
106 and founded in the history of the Rule.
First, the doctrine of completeness embodied in FRE 106 should not be
triggered unless a truncated statement has been introduced that creates a
misleading impression. The otherwise inadmissible evidence used for
completion must be not only relevant but essential to clarifying or explaining
the previously admitted statement.291
Second, parties must be prepared to show with some precision how the
incomplete evidence has been taken out of context and in what way it is
misleading. Courts would not have to take a party’s assertions at face
value.292 In fact, under FRE 104(c), a court could conduct a hearing to
consider the evidence and determine its admissibility for completion
purposes.293 For example, in United States v. Soures, the Third Circuit
created a four-part test to determine when remainder evidence “ought in
fairness be considered contemporaneously” with its truncated portion.294
Under that test, once a party establishes that only a part of a statement has
been introduced, the trial court must then consider whether the remainder
evidence “is necessary to (1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the
289

See Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 670.
See discussion supra Part III.
291
The requirements of relevance and clarification harken back to the limitations
originally imposed on the common law Rule. See discussion supra accompanying notes 36–
39.
292
Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d. at 668.
293
See FED. R. EVID. 104 (“The court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question
so that the jury cannot hear it if: . . . the hearing involves the admissibility of a
confession; . . . or justice so requires.”).
294
736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984). Many other courts have adopted the four-part test as
well. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474–75 (7th Cir. 1992).
290
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admitted portion in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure
a fair and impartial understanding.”295 If the Advisory Committee embraced
this test, it would create a clear framework for trial courts to make FRE 106
decisions and establish clear and consistent precedent.
Third, a trial court should be especially receptive to FRE 106
completion evidence when it implicates a party’s constitutional rights.296 This
happens most often in criminal cases where the prosecution introduces
evidence, usually the defendant’s own confession, that can only be
effectively rebutted by the defendant taking the stand and waiving his or her
constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment not to testify.297 “A criminal
defendant should not be forced to choose between leaving the government’s
distorted presentation unanswered and surrendering” his or her Fifth
Amendment right.298 This situation clearly frustrates the principle of fairness
explicitly stated in the language of FRE 106. Several courts have adopted this
rationale as part of the fairness inquiry when deciding whether to allow
otherwise inadmissible evidence,299 and the Federal Rules should do the
same.

295
Soures, 736 F.2d at 91. Beyond this initial test, Wright and Graham have identified
additional factors that can also help courts identify when completion evidence should be
permitted under the fairness doctrine of Rule 106:
(1) Can the misleading impression be dispelled by other means?; (2) How much
evidence is needed to dispel the misleading effect?; (3) How strong is the evidence
admitted and omitted?; (4) How long will repair be delayed if not accelerated?; (5)
What is the consequential fact to be proved?; (6) How much will completion disrupt
or prejudice proponent?; and (7) What part did counsel play in truncating the
evidence?

See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5077.2.
296
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5077.2.
297
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
298
See Baker, supra note 14, at 305 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
299
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5077.2; see also United States v. Marin, 669
F.2d 73, 85 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713 (7th Cir.
1981) which stated:
[W]hen the government offers in evidence a defendant’s confession and in
confessing the defendant has also made exculpatory statements that the government
seeks to omit, the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights may be implicated. In such
circumstances . . . the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is violated when the
omission “paint[s] a distorted picture . . . which [the defendant is] powerless to
remedy without taking the stand.).
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Expanding FRE 106 to include oral statements would often lead to
violations of the Rule Against Hearsay.300 To address this issue, some
scholars advocate further amending FRE 106 itself to allow completion
evidence “even if the completing statement is otherwise inadmissible under
the rule against hearsay.”301 However, this approach does not fit within the
existing structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The current iteration of
the Federal Rules of Evidence confines all hearsay rules, including
definitions, exclusions, and exceptions, to “Article VIII: Hearsay.”302 While
the Rules sometimes cross-reference one another,303 in no other location do
they create an exception to the Rule Against Hearsay outside of Article VIII.
Adding an exception to the Rule Against Hearsay to Article I, which is titled,
“General Provisions” is incongruent and invites later interpretive problems
when courts may be called upon to decide whether the locations create a
distinction with a difference.304
As a result, an exception to the Rule Against Hearsay should be created
in FRE 803 to admit statements that qualify under FRE 106. Federal Rule of
Evidence 803 contains the majority of the hearsay exceptions, and under FRE
803 the availability of the declarant is immaterial.305 Adding an exception
under FRE 803 for statements used for completeness would mimic the way
other rules manage the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay and
would not raise questions regarding issues such as the need for an available
or unavailable declarant.306

300

See FED. R. EVID. 802.
See Capra & Richter, supra note 20, at 958.
302
See FED. R. EVID. 801–07. The Rules outlined in FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)–(2) operate
as exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay, but are often called “exclusions” or “exemptions”
to the Rule Against Hearsay because, contrary to Rules 803 and 804, they define some
statements as “non-hearsay.”
303
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (“Evidence of a witness’s character may be admitted
under Rules 607, 608, and 609.”); FED. R. EVID. 101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings in
United States courts. The specific courts and proceedings to which the rules apply, along with
exceptions, are set out in Rule 1101.”).
304
For example, FRE 801(1)(A)–(C) admits some hearsay statements when the declarant
is available to testify and us subject to cross-examination, FRE 804 admits only limited
statements when the declarant is unavailable, and FRE 803 allows for the admission of some
hearsay statements regardless of the availability of the declarant. Courts may be called upon
to determine where a FRE 106 exception falls on the issue of the declarant’s availability.
305
See FED. R. EVID. 803.
306
See id. Inadmissible hearsay is also often admitted for something other than the truth
of the matter asserted, thus circumventing the ban on hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). Under
these circumstances, courts “on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope
and instruct the jury accordingly.” FED. R. EVID. 105.
301
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For example, under FRE 608(b) evidence is admissible on crossexamination “to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to
attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.”307 Such statements
would almost certainly constitute hearsay, but the drafters anticipated such a
problem and included a hearsay exception in FRE 803(21) for evidence of
“[a] reputation among a person’s associates or in the community concerning
the person’s character.”308 A similar exception should be made for
completeness evidence that qualifies under FRE 106, which would read as
follows:
Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay –
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness. [ . . . ]
(25) Remainder and Related Out of Court Statements. Statements Otherwise
Admissible under Rule 106.

These changes to FRE 106 and FRE 803 would work together to create
a two-step process before statements used for completeness purposes could
be admitted at trial. Any statement deemed necessary for completeness must
first qualify under the fairness analysis of FRE 106. Only by meeting those
requirements would the statement be deemed admissible by the proposed
hearsay exception under FRE 803. These recommendations, if adopted, will
help guide and unify federal and state courts’ completeness jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of completeness, a centuries-old stalwart of AngloAmerican jurisprudence now partially enshrined in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is one tool designed to ensure that the American judicial system
achieves the ideals of truth, justice, and fairness. However, this goal cannot
be realized if parties to a dispute are allowed to unfairly manipulate the
adversarial process. Taking an opponent’s statements, mining them for a few
choice words and phrases, and then attempting to exclude the rest is an
underhanded scheme that does not serve the interests of justice. It also
directly undermines the goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence: “to
administer every proceeding fairly . . . to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.”309
The common law Rule of Completeness guarded against such abuses
with a broad policy of admitting evidence necessary to correct a misleading

307
308
309

FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
FED. R. EVID. 803(21).
FED. R. EVID. 102.
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impression. Federal Rule of Evidence 106 followed in the common law’s
footsteps. However, in its zeal to correct the common law’s shortcoming by
adding an acceleration clause, the assurance of protection against truncated
oral statements was lost in the process. It is time for the Federal Rules of
Evidence to reclaim two important pieces of the completeness puzzle: (1)
oral statements and (2) otherwise inadmissible evidence used for the purpose
of completion. If fairness is the goal of FRE 106, it cannot be fully achieved
until the modern completeness doctrine more closely resembles its common
law predecessor.
APPENDIX
Table 1: Federal Court Positions on the Rule of Completeness
Circuit

1st Circuit

2nd Circuit

3rd Circuit

4th Circuit

Federal Circuit Courts
Jurisprudence/ Rule
Interpretation: Extends to oral statements through FRE 611(a).
See supra note 137 (citing United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d
565, 579 (1st Cir. 2010)). Acts as a rule of admissibility. See
supra note 206 (citing United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133
(1st Cir. 2008)).
Additional Sources: United States v. Altvater, 954 F.3d 45, 49
(1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]he rule of completeness allows for the
admission of otherwise inadmissible statements . . . .”).
Interpretation: Oral statements are admissible under the
common law rule of completeness. See supra note 141 (citing
United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2019)).
Acts as a rule of admissibility. See supra note 207 (citing United
States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 2007); United
States v. Kopp, 562 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2009); United States
v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 85 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 60 (2d Cir. 2019)).
Interpretation: Recognized as a rule of admissibility to
comport with fairness standard in FRE 102. See supra note 208
(citing United States v. Green, 694 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa.
1988), aff’d 875 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Interpretation: Reaches opposite conclusions on the
applicability of otherwise inadmissible evidence used under
FRE 106. See supra notes 214–21 (citing United States v.
Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v.
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Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Chamberlain, 868 F.3d 290 (4th
Cir. 2017)).
Interpretation: Extends to oral statements through FRE 611(a).
See supra note 137 (citing United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699,
727–28 (5th Cir. 1996)). But it is limited in certain ways—FRE
106 does not apply to a witness’s testimony at trial nor is simply
quoting from a transcript tantamount to admittance of the
evidence. See supra note 166 (citing United States v. Garcia,
530 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2008)). Recognizes Rule 106 as a rule of
admissibility.
Additional Sources: United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144,
176 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The rule [of completeness] operates
independently from FRE 801(d)(1)(B) and allows the admission
of such statements even when they are otherwise barred by the
hearsay rules.”).
Interpretation: Extends to oral statements through FRE 611(a).
See supra note 137 (citing United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641,
652 (6th Cir. 2014)). Does not allow for inadmissible evidence
(i.e., FRE 106 is not a rule of admissibility). See supra notes
182–83 (citing United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 651–52 (6th
Cir. 2014); United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826 (6th Cir.
2013)).
Additional Sources: United States v. McQuarrie, 817 F. App’x
63, 78 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Costner, 684
F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982)) (“We have held that the rule of
completeness reflected in [FRE] 106 . . . ‘is not designed to
make something admissible that should be excluded.’”); United
States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 883 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“[FRE] 106, furthermore, does not transform inadmissible
hearsay into admissible evidence.”); United States v. Benchick,
725 F. App’x 361, 366 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he rule of
completeness cannot trump the hearsay rules.”).
Interpretation: Extends to oral statements through use of FRE
611(a). See supra note 138 (citing United States v. Haddad, 10
F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lewis, 954
F.2d 1386, 1392 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Velasco, 953
F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992)). Otherwise inadmissible
evidence is admissible to correct misleading impressions under
FRE 106. See supra notes 226–29 (citing United States v.

886

8th Circuit
9th Circuit

10th Circuit

11th Circuit

D.C. Circuit

HEINY & NUVAN

[Vol. 111

LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Additional Sources: Cf. United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867,
876 (7th Cir. 2012) (abrogated on other grounds) (“[A] party
cannot use the doctrine of completeness to circumvent [FRE]
803’s exclusion of hearsay testimony.”).
Interpretation: N/A.
Interpretation: Strictly interprets FRE 106 and does not
consider oral statements or inadmissible evidence under its
doctrine of completeness. See supra note 125 (citing United
States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Interpretation: Extends to oral statements through FRE 611(a).
See supra note 137 (citing United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596
F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010)). Operates as a rule of
admissibility to comport with fairness standard in Rule 102. See
supra note 209 (citing United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d
716, 734, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Harry, 816
F.3d 1268, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2016)).
Interpretation: Applies to certain oral statements. See United
States v. Santos, 947 F.3d 711, 730 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Although
[FRE] 106 on its face applies only to written or recorded
statements, this Court has extended the rule to the exculpatory
portions of a criminal defendant’s post-arrest oral statements.”).
Interpretation: FRE 106 can adequately fulfill its function only
by permitting the admission of some otherwise inadmissible
evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered
evidence should be considered contemporaneously. See supra
note 194 (citing United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C.
Cir. 1986)).

Table 2: State Court Positions on the Rule of Completeness
State

Alabama

State Courts
Jurisprudence/ Rule
Text: Adopted a modified version of the 1987 Federal Rule.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.88.
“Rule 106. Remainder of Writings or Recorded Statements
When a party introduces part of either a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction at that
time of any other part of the writing or statement that ought in
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fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” ALA. R.
EVID. 106.
Interpretation: The Alabama rule “is not intended to affect
preexisting Alabama applications of the completeness doctrine
that lie outside the confines of Rule 106.” See supra note 111
(citing ALA. R. EVID. 106 Advisory Committee’s Notes).
Alabama rejects oral statements because its version of FRE
106 does not allow them. See supra note 164 (citing WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, § 5074.1 & nn.8, 20, 25). But see ALA. R. EVID.
106 Advisory Committee’s Notes (“Rule 106 applies only to
writings and recorded statements or parts thereof. This rule is
not intended to affect preexisting Alabama applications of the
completeness doctrine that lie outside the confines of Rule
106. The rule, for example, has no impact upon instances when
the completeness doctrine is applied to unrecorded
conversations. A prominent example of such an application,
having continuing existence after adoption of Rule 106, is the
rule that if one party proves any part of an unrecorded oral
conversation or oral statement, the other party has the right to
prove the relevant remainder of it.”).
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of, or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” ALASKA R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Elson v. State, Nos. A-2892, A-4297, 1993
WL 13156823, at *10–11 (Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993)
(holding that Alaska Rule of Evidence 106 applies only when a
party introduces a writing or the physical recording or
transcription of an oral statement and does not apply to the
testimony of witnesses). Not interpreted as a rule of
admissibility. See supra note 189 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 10, § 5078.1).
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106 (amended in
2012). WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing ARIZ. R.
EVID. 106); id. § 5078.1.
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“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” ARIZ. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Interpreted as a rule of admissibility See supra
note 212. Applies to oral statements. See State v. Tinnell, No.
2 CA-CR 2018-0126, 2019 WL 2894359, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App.
July 3, 2019) (quoting State v. Ellison, 140 P.3d 899, 914 n.9
(Ariz. 2006) (“The rule [of completeness] is ‘equally
applicable to oral statements.’”).
Additional sources: State v. Tinnell, No. 2 CA-CR 20180126, 2019 WL 2894359, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 3, 2019)
(quoting State v. Prasertphong, 114 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz.
2005)) (“[A] hearsay statement introduced under ‘the rule of
completeness,’ pursuant to Rule 106, is ‘admissible on a
nonhearsay theory,’ provided the admitted evidence is ‘so
closely connected to the part the proponent contemplates
introducing that it furnishes integral context for that part.’”);
State v. Rios, No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0141, 2020 WL 1509396, at
*2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2020) (citing State v.
Prasertphong, 114 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2005) (noting that the
evidence “should have been admitted under the rule of
completeness, even if it otherwise would have constituted selfserving hearsay.”); State v. Champagne, 447 P.3d 297, 315
(Ariz. 2019) (“The same rule generally applies to non-recorded
statements.”).
Text: Adopted and retains the Uniform Rule, Second, version
of FRE 106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071 n.79 (citing ARK. R.
EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of Or Related Writings Or Recorded
Statements
Whenever a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which in fairness ought to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” ARK. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: N/A.
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Text: Codified the common law completeness doctrine along
the lines of the Field Code. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.70.
“§ 356. Entire act, declaration, conversation, or writing to
elucidate part offered
Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is
given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject
may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read,
the answer may be given; and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any
other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is
necessary to make it understood may also be given in
evidence.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 356.
Interpretation: California’s rule extends to oral conversations
and allows otherwise inadmissible evidence to be considered
(already provided for in the Field Code adoption states See
supra note 125; see also supra note 162 (citing WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071).
Additional Sources: Mark B. Simons, SIMONS CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 1.16 (“Although framed as an expansion
of the concept of relevancy, Evidence Code [section] 356 most
often operates in the manner of a hearsay exception.”).
Text: Identical to the 1975 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.80 (citing COLO. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” COLO. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Colorado rejects oral statements because their
courts have found that the common law Rule of Completeness
did not survive the passage of FRE 106. See supra note 164
(citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5074.1 & nn.8, 20, 25). But see
People v. Short, 425 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo. App. 2018) (The
Colorado Court of Appeals appears to have recently adopted
the opposite position, stating, “Nonetheless, following the lead
of federal case law on the subject, we conclude that Rule
106 principles also apply to the [oral testimony] proffered by
the prosecution here under CRE 611(a)—which is
substantively identical to Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).”). Because this
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holding has not been affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court,
and there is conflicting case law, it is premature to definitively
state that Colorado consistently allows the admittance of oral
statements. Evidence to complete is admissible as non-hearsay.
See supra note 212 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1).
Additional Sources: People v. Short, 425 P.3d 1208, 1220
(Colo. App. 2018) (“Persuaded by this latter group of
authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly
determined that Short’s otherwise inadmissible self-serving
hearsay was admissible under the rule of completeness to
qualify, explain, or place into context the evidence proffered
by the prosecution.”).
Text: An idiosyncratic version of FRE 106 has been adopted.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.101 (citing CONN. CODE EVID.
§ 1-5).
“Sec. 1-5. Remainder of Statements
(a) Contemporaneous introduction by proponent. When a
statement is introduced by a party, the court may, and upon
request shall, require the proponent at that time to introduce
any other part of the statement, whether or not otherwise
admissible, that the court determines, considering the context
of the first part of the statement, ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.
(b) Introduction by another party. When a statement is
introduced by a party, another party may introduce any other
part of the statement, whether or not otherwise admissible, that
the court determines, considering the context of the first part of
the statement, ought in fairness to be considered with it.”
CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-5.
Interpretation: Evidence to complete is admissible as
nonhearsay. See supra note 212 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
§ 5078.1). Applies to oral statements. See Commentary to
CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-5 (“Statement, as used in this
subsection, includes written, recorded and oral statements.
Because the other part of the statement is introduced for the
purpose of placing the first part into context, the other part
need not be independently admissible.”).
Additional Sources: State v. Norman P., 186 A.3d 1143,
1154–55 (Conn. 2018) (“[Section] 1-5 (b) of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence requires that the relevant remainder be
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admitted—even if that remainder would otherwise be
inadmissible.”).
Text: Identical to the 1975 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.80 (citing DEL. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded
statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” DEL. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Evidence offered to complete is offered for
non-hearsay purpose. See supra note 212 (citing Thompson v.
State, 205 A.3d 827, 834 (Del. 2019)).
Delaware’s rule extends to oral conversations. See Thompson,
205 A.3d at 834–35 (“Importantly, Rule 106 ‘applies to an oral
quotation from a part of a document . . . .’”).
Text: An idiosyncratic version of FRE 106 has been adopted,
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.102 (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 90.108).
“90.108. Introduction of related writings or recorded
statements
(1) When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him or her
at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement that in fairness ought to be considered
contemporaneously. An adverse party is not bound by
evidence introduced under this section.
(2) The report of a court reporter, when certified to by the
court reporter as being a correct transcript of the testimony and
proceedings in the case, is prima facie a correct statement of
such testimony and proceedings.” FLA. STAT. § 90.108 (2021).
Interpretation: Allows for oral statements. See supra notes
150, 157 (citing Whitfield v. State, 933 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). It is unclear whether it has been
construed as a rule of admissibility. See supra note 190 (citing
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1; Schreiber v. State, 973 So. 2d
1265, 1269 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
Additional Sources: See also Nock v. State, 256 So. 3d 828,
835 (Fla. 2018) (finding oral statements within the scope of the
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rule of completeness by way of common law and not by way
of statute).
Text:
“§ 24-1-106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which, in fairness, should be considered
contemporaneously with the writing or recorded statement.”
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-106 (2021).
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Modified the original version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, nn.81, 86 (citing HAW. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party
at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rule
106 (2021).
Interpretation: N/A.
Text: Modified the original version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, nn.82, 86.
“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” I.R.E., Rule 106.
Interpretation: N/A.
Text: Modified versions of the 1987 Federal Rule (adopted in
2011). WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” ILL. R. EVID. 106.
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Interpretation: Illinois courts have found that oral statements
both are and are not allowed. Compare People v. Jones, 2018
IL App (2d) 160372-U, ¶ 50 (“Here, defendant’s statements
were all oral and unrecorded, making Rule 106 inapplicable.”),
with People v. Waikong, 2020 IL App (1st) 180203-U, ¶ 44
(“The remainder of a writing, recorded statement, or oral
statement is admissible under either Rule 106 or the common
law doctrine . . . .”).
Text: Modified versions of the 1987 Federal Rule. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.89.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writing or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded
statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” IND. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Relies on the precedent of the common law
Rule of Completeness to allow oral statements. See supra note
156 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5074.1 & nn.8, 10, 19, 21–
24); id. at note 157 (citing Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280,
286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Bars the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible evidence for completeness. See supra note 189
(citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1).
Text: Codified the common law completeness doctrine along
the lines of the Field Code. See supra note 50 (citing WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, § 5078.2, n.9); see also id. at note 162 (citing
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071).
“Rule 5.106. Remainder of related acts, declarations,
conversations, writings, or recorded statements
a. If a party introduces all or part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party
may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part or
any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded
statement that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.
b. Upon an adverse party’s request, the court may require the
offering party to introduce at the same time with all or part of
the act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded
statement, any other part or any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing, or recorded statement that is admissible
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under rule 5.106(a). Rule 5.106(b), however, does not limit the
right of any party to develop further on cross-examination or in
the party’s case in chief matters admissible under rule
5.106(a).” IOWA CODE ANN. R. 5.106.
Interpretation: Because of the codification of the Field Code,
Iowa allows for use of oral statements. See supra note 162
(citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071).
Text: N/A
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing KY. R. EVID. 106).
“KRE 106 Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” KY. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Kentucky prohibits defendants from using the
completeness doctrine to require witnesses to include
exculpatory portions of an oral confession. See supra note 164
(citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5074.1 & nn.8, 20, 25).
Kentucky bars the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence for completeness. See supra note 189 (citing WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, § 5078.1). But see Schrimsher v. Commonwealth,
190 S.W.3d 318, 330–31 (Ky. 2006) (“[A] party purporting to
invoke KRE 106 for the admission of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay statements may only do so to the extent that an
opposing party’s introduction of an incomplete out-of-court
statement would render the statement misleading or alter its
perceived meaning.” However, the court further clarified,
“KRE 106 does not ‘open the door’ for introduction of the
entire statement or make other portions thereof admissible for
any reason once an opposing party has introduced a portion of
it.”).
Text: Louisiana originally considered a version of FRE 106
that broadened its Rule to the scope of the common law
completeness doctrine, but the legislature deleted this
provision for reasons that do not appear in the historical
record. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.74.
Interpretation: N/A
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Text: Originally adopted an idiosyncratic version of FRE 106.
Amended in 2015 to reflect the text of the 2011 restyled rule in
Federal Rules of Evidence. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.103
(citing ME. R. EVID. 106).
“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
utilized in court by a party, an adverse party has the right upon
request to inspect it. The court on motion of the adverse party
may require the introduction at that time of the writing or
recorded statement or any part thereof or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be then
considered.” ME. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Courts are concerned that if defendants are not
allowed to complete their oral confessions, police officers
would only record those statements that were completely
inculpatory. See supra note 165 (citing State v. Thibeault, 621
A.2d 418, 422 (Me. 1993)).
Text: Modified versions of the 1987 Federal Rule. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.90; id. § 5074.1, n.21.
“Rule 5-106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When part or all of a writing or recorded statement is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” MD. CODE ANN. R. 5-106.
Interpretation: Maryland uses a combined approach,
admitting oral evidence under the common law Rule of
Completeness and then using FRE 106 to accelerate that
completeness. See supra note 156; id. at n.159 (citing WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, § 5074.1 & nn.21, 23). Maryland bars the
introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence. See supra
note 189 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1). The
Maryland judiciary holds that only its version of FRE 106 does
not allow evidence that is otherwise inadmissible to be
admitted. “However, where the evidence sought to be admitted
is not otherwise admissible, the evidence may be admitted, in
fairness,” under the common law doctrine of verbal
completeness. See supra note 189 (citing Otto v. State, 187
A.3d 47, 61 (Md. 2018)).
Additional Sources: “The Rule does not provide for the
admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence, except to the
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extent that it is necessary, in fairness, to explain what the
opposing party has elicited. In that event, a limiting instruction
that the evidence was admitted not as substantive proof but as
explanatory of the other evidence would be appropriate. See
Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611 (1991).” MD. CODE ANN. R.
5-106, Committee Note.
Text: The original Mass. R. Evid. 106 was identical to the
1975 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.105.
“Section 106. Doctrine of Completeness
(a) Remainder of Writings or Recorded Statements. If a party
introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, the
court may permit an adverse party to introduce any other part
of the writing or statement that is (1) on the same subject, (2)
part of the same writing or conversation, and (3) necessary to
an understanding of the admitted writing or statement.
(b) Curative Admissibility. When the erroneous admission of
evidence causes a party to suffer significant prejudice, the
court may permit incompetent evidence to be introduced to
cure or minimize the prejudice.” MASS. R. EVID. § 106.
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Originally adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. Now
identical with FRE 106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87
(citing MICH. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” MICH R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Combines FRE 106 with an FRE 403 analysis
to determine whether to admit oral statements. See supra note
161 (citing 1 JAMES K. ROBINSON, RONALD S. LONGHOFER &
NORMAN C. ANKERS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE:
EVIDENCE 88 (2d ed. 2002)).
Additional Sources: People v. Clark, 948 N.W.2d 604, 623
(Mich. Ct. App. 2019) (“MRE 106 has no bearing on the
admissibility of the underlying evidence[.]”); People v. Rose,
No. 342633, 2019 WL 6170828, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.
19, 2019) (citing People v. Bowen, 135 N.W. 824, 826 (Mich.
1912) (“‘[W]here the prosecution puts in evidence a
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confession which is part of a conversation the accused is
entitled to prove as part of his defense the entire conversation.’
However, ‘[i]n a definition of the limits of this right, there may
be noted three general corollaries of the principle on which the
rights rest, namely: (a) No utterance irrelevant to the issue is
receivable. (b) No more of the remainder of the utterance than
concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the first part,
is receivable. (c) The remainder thus received merely aids in
the construction of the utterances as a whole, and is not in
itself testimony.’”).
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” MINN. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Not interpreted as a rule of admissibility. See
supra note 189 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1).
Additional Sources: See also Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357,
364 (Minn. 2020) (“The rule does not govern its
admissibility—in fact, the additional material must be
independently admissible.”); Krenske Constr., Inc. v. Draper,
No. A17-0974, 2018 WL 1902447, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
23, 2018) (finding no abuse of discretion in excluding redacted
communications under Rule 106 where “[f]airness require[d]
that the communications be submitted in their unredacted
entirety, or not at all,” and where the “complete, unredacted
communications” were not presented to the court).
Text: Originally adopted a version identical to the 1975
version of FRE 106. Now identical to FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.80.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” MISS. R. EVID. 106.
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Interpretation:
In the Advisory Committee’s notes it states, “This rule is a
codification of the common law doctrine of
completeness . . . However, Rule 106 is somewhat narrower
than Mississippi common law. The rule only applies . . . to
written or recorded statements . . . Under Mississippi case law
the rule of completeness is extended to other writings and even
to oral statements.” See supra note 158 (citing MISS. R. EVID.
106, Advisory Committee Notes). Mississippi courts have
occasionally allowed the use of otherwise inadmissible
evidence for completion, but there are examples of the
opposite position as well, so the ultimate outcome is uncertain.
See supra note 213 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1 &
nn.80–81).
Additional Sources: See Fontaine v. State, 256 So. 3d 615,
622 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (“The audio-recorded polygraph
interview also should be weighed under the other criteria
contained in our rules of evidence. E.g., Rials v. Duckworth,
822 So.2d 283, 287 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2002) (affirming the denial
of portions of a police report into evidence under Rule 106
because the report contained hearsay).”).
N/A
Text: Adopted the Field Code version of the completeness
doctrine. See supra note 162 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
§ 5071).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or related acts, writings, or
statements
(a) When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or
recorded statement or series thereof is introduced by a party:
(1) an adverse party may require the introduction at that time
of any other part of such item or series thereof which ought in
fairness to be considered at that time; or
(2) an adverse party may inquire into or introduce any other
part of such item of evidence or series thereof.
(b) This rule does not limit the right of any party to crossexamine or further develop as part of the case matters covered
by this rule.” MONT. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Bars the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible evidence for completeness. See supra note 189
(citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1). But see Commission
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Comment, MONT. R. EVID. 106 (“The Montana completeness
rule allows evidence which would ordinarily be inadmissible
on its own to be admitted.”).
Text: Codifying the common law completeness doctrine along
the lines of the Field Code. See supra note 50 (citing WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, § 5078.2, n.9).
“27-106. Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or
recorded statements; action of judge
(1) When part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing is
given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject
may be inquired into by the other. When a letter is read, all
other letters on the same subject between the same parties may
be given. When a detached act, declaration, conversation or
writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration or
writing which is necessary to make it fully understood, or to
explain the same, may also be given in evidence.
(2) The judge may in his discretion either require the party thus
introducing part of a total communication to introduce at that
time such other parts as ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it or may permit another party to do
so at that time.” NEB. REV STAT. § 27-106.
Interpretation: In adopting the Field Code version of the
completeness doctrine, Nebraska’s Rule 106 allows for oral
statements. See supra note 162.
Additional Sources: See State v. Mrza, 926 N.W.2d 79, 88
(Neb. 2019) (“The rule of completeness allows a party to admit
the entirety of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing
when the other party admits a part and when the entirety is
necessary to make it fully understood.” (citing State v. Savage,
920 N.W.2d 692 (Neb. 2018)).
Text: Nevada jumped the gun to adopt a modified version of
the Preliminary Draft of FRE 106:
“1. When any part of a writing or recorded statement is
introduced by a party, the party may be required at that time to
introduce any other part of it which is relevant to the part
introduced, and any party may introduce any other relevant
parts.
2. This section does not limit cross-examination.” NEV. REV.
STATS. § 47.120.
Interpretation: Allows for oral statements. See supra note 160
(citing Domingues v. State, 917 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1996)).
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Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing State v. Mitchell, 94 A.3d 859,
865 (N.H. 2014) (quoting 1987 version)).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
(a) If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at the
time, of any other part-- or any other writing or recorded
statement-- that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.
(b) A party has a right to introduce the remainder of an
unrecorded statement or conversation that his or her opponent
introduced so far as it relates:
(1) to the same subject matter; and
(2) tends to explain or shed light on the meaning of the part
already received.” N.H. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: New Hampshire rejects oral statements
because its courts have found that the common law Rule of
Completeness did not survive the passage of FRE 106. See
supra note 164 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5074.1 & nn.8,
20, 25). Interpreted as a rule of admissibility; evidence offered
under Rule 106 is interpreted as evidence offered for nonhearsay purpose See supra note 212 (citing WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5078.1).
Text: Originally adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106.
Amended in 2019 and the following became effective July 1,
2020. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing N.J. R. EVID.
106).
“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part, or any other writing or recorded
statement, that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” N.J. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Originally adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106.
Amended in 2012 to be consistent with the restyling of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87
(citing N.M. R. EVID. 11-106).
“Rule 11-106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
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If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” N.M. R. EVID. 11-106.
Interpretation: N/A
Text: The New York drafters started out by copying FRE 106,
but later drafted a unique version of the completeness doctrine.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.106. Today, New York’s Civil
Practice Law and Rules, Rule 4517(b), captures a part of the
rule of completeness:
“If only part of the prior trial testimony of a witness is read at
the trial by a party, any other party may read any other part of
the prior testimony of that witness that ought in fairness to be
considered in connection with the part read.” N.Y. CIVIL
PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 4517(b) (McKinney 2021).
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Original identical to the 1975 version of FRE 106, now
identical to the restyled FRE 106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
§ 5071, n.80.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” N.C. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Does not apply to oral conversations. See
State v. Edwards, 820 S.E.2d 862, 869 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018)
(“The commentary to Rule 106 explains that, ‘[f]or practical
reasons, the rule is limited to writings and recorded statements
and does not apply to conversations.’”).
Additional Sources: N/A.
Text: Modified versions of the 1987 version of FRE 106.
Amended in 2014 to reflect the 2014 revised version of FRE
106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.91.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an opposing party may require the introduction, at
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that time, of any other part, or any other writing or recorded
statement, that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” N.D. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Allows for oral statements under FRE 611(a).
See supra note 150. Does not interpret Rule 106 as a Rule of
Admissibility. See supra note 189.
Additional Sources: State v. Muhammad, 931 N.W.2d 181,
183 (N.D. 2019) (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 106, Explanatory
Note) (“The explanatory note to Rule 106 also provides the
following: ‘Rule 106 is not a rule of admissibility, but rather
one dealing with order of proof[.]’”).
Text: Modified the original version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.83 (citing OHIO R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which is otherwise admissible and which
ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”
OHIO R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Does not apply to oral statements. See OHIO
R. EVID. 106 Staff Notes (“The rule is limited to writings and
recordings; it does not apply to conversations.”).
Additional Sources: OHIO R. EVID. 106 Staff Notes (“In
contrast to the Federal Rule, Rule 106 explicitly provides that
it does not make admissible a writing or a part thereof that is
otherwise inadmissible.”).
Text: Modified versions of the 1987 version of FRE 106,
amended in 2002 and is now identical to FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.92.
“§ 12-2107. Remainder of record
When a record or part thereof is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other record that should in fairness be
considered contemporaneously with it.” O KLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 2107 (2021).
Interpretation: N/A
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Text: Codifies the common law completeness doctrine along
the lines of the Field Code. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.96,
§ 5078.1, § 5078.2 & n.8.
“Rule 106. When part of transaction proved, whole admissible
When part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing is
given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject,
where otherwise admissible, may at that time be inquired into
by the other; when a letter is read, the answer may at that time
be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation or
writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation or writing which is necessary to make it
understood may at that time also be given in evidence.” OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.040 (2021).
Interpretation: Allows for oral statements to be offered. See
supra note 162. Not interpreted as a rule of admissibility. See
supra note 193 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.2 & n.8).
Additional Sources: Editors’ Notes, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.040
(“The text of ORS 41.880 is amended (1) to allow
contemporaneous as well as later introduction of the remainder
of a writing or event, (2) but only, in either event, if the
remaining evidence is otherwise admissible.”); State v. Smith,
455 P.3d 520, 524 (Or. Ct. App. 2019), rev’d, 466 P.3d 61
(2020) (finding hearsay statements inadmissible under Rule
106 where no independent basis for admission existed); State
v. Batty, 819 P.2d 732, 737 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he
supplementary evidence must be ‘otherwise admissible.’ There
must be an independent basis for admission apart from OEC
106.”).
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. Amended to
reflect present-day FRE106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87
(citing PA. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded
statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” PA. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: N/A
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Text: Idiosyncratic versions of FRE 106 have been adopted.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071. The current version of the rule,
§ 8 Related evidence, states:
“When a writ, video or tape recording or part thereof is
introduced as evidence by a party, the other party may require
the introduction at that moment, of the rest of the writ, video or
tape recording which was partially introduced, or of any other
writ, video or tape recording which must be introduced at the
same time, for a full understanding of the matter.” P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 32a, § 8 (1995).
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Modified the original version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, nn.84 & 86 (citing R.I. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him or her
at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” R.I. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing S.C. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Statements
When a writing, or recorded statement, or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” S.C. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Allows for otherwise inadmissible evidence to
be properly admitted. See State v. Hawes, 813 S.E.2d 513, 525
(S.C. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting State v. Page, 663 S.E.2d 357,
360 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)) (“It is firmly established that
otherwise inadmissible evidence may be properly admitted
when opposing counsel opens the door to that evidence.”).
Additional Sources: N/A.
Text: Identical to the 1975 version of FRE 106 and amended
in 2016 to reflect restyled FRE 106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
§ 5071, n.80.
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“19-19-106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-106 (1979).
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing TENN. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Writings or Recorded Statements--Completeness
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” TENN. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Not interpreted as a rule of admissibility. See
supra note 189 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1).
Text: Adopted both a modified 1975 version of FRE 106
(amended in 2015 to reflect the current FRE 106) and a Field
Code provision. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.100.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may introduce, at that time, any
other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in
fairness ought to be considered at the same time. ‘Writing or
recorded statement’ includes depositions.” TEX. R. EVID. 106.
“Rule 107. Rule of Optional Completeness
If a party introduces part of an act, declaration, conversation,
writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may inquire
into any other part on the same subject. An adverse party may
also introduce any other act, declaration, conversation, writing,
or recorded statement that is necessary to explain or allow the
trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by the
opponent. ‘Writing or recorded statement’ includes a
deposition.” TEX. R. EVID. 107.
Interpretation: Evidence offered to correct a misleading
impression is offered for non-hearsay purpose. See supra note
212 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5078.1).
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Additional Sources: Evidence that is necessary to “fully and
fairly explain a matter ‘opened up’ by the adverse party,”
pursuant to Rule 107, falls within “an exception to the hearsay
rule that permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible
evidence.” Johnson v. State, No. 02-17-00382-CR, 2019 WL
4309171, at *5 (Tex. App. Sept. 12, 2019).
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106 and amended to
reflect current FRE 106. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87
(citing UTAH R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded
statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” UTAH R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Cannot admit oral statements directly through
Rule 106, but theoretically could through Rule 611. See supra
note 151 (citing State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Utah
2003)).
Additional Sources: “[M]ere testimony about a conversation
that happened to also be recorded is insufficient to
trigger rule 106.” State v. Sanchez, 422 P.3d 866, 872 (Utah
2018).
Text: Identical to the 1975 version of FRE 106 and amended
to reflect the current version of FRE 106.WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
§ 5071, n.80.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” VT. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Unlikely to extend to oral statements but it
does operate as a rule of admissibility. “Under the broad
‘fairness’ standard of the rule, the adverse party should be
permitted to require introduction of other parts of the writing
or related writings that help to explain the original writing
even when they are incompetent as hearsay or otherwise.” VT.
R. EVID. 106 Reporter’s Notes.
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N/A
Text: Modified the original version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, nn.85 & 86 (citing WASH. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party
at that time to introduce any other part, or any other writing or
recorded statement, which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” WASH. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: N/A
Text: Adopted the 1987 version of FRE 106 and amended in
2014 to reflect the 2011 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.87 (citing W. VA. R. EVID. 106).
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may request the introduction, at
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.” W. VA. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: Combines FRE 611 with the common law
completeness doctrine to allow for oral statements. See supra
note 156. Allows evidence offered under the rule of
completeness as offered for a non-hearsay purpose See supra
note 212.
Text: Wisconsin originally adopted the Revised Draft of Rule
106 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5071, nn.76–77 (referencing
Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 329 (1971);
WIS. STAT. § 901-07 (2021)). It has since amended the rule as
follows:
“When any part of a writing or statement, whether recorded or
unrecorded, is introduced by a party, an adverse party may
require the party at that time to introduce any other part or any
other writing or statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it to provide context or
prevent distortion.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 901.07 (West 2018).
Interpretation: This amendment is consistent with State v.
Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 651 (Wis. 1998), which
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acknowledged that the rule of completeness is applicable to
oral testimony, and with State v. Anderson, 600 N.W.2d 913,
921 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 604 N.W.2d 573
(1999), which provided guidance on how, and when, to apply
the rule of completeness. Evidence offered to complete is
offered for non-hearsay purpose. See supra note 212 (citing
Wright & Graham, § 5078.1).
Text: Identical to the 1975 version of FRE 106. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, § 5071, n.80.
“Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.” WYO. R. EVID. 106.
Interpretation: N/A

